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ABSTRACT
The nature and level of recent foreign equity investment in
commercial real estate in Chicago, Illinois was analyzed as
one part of a larger study in which the transactions
involving foreign investors within three individual markets
(Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and Chicago) are being
studied to analyze current foreign direct investment
patterns in the United States. This study identifies
foreign investors active in the Chicago real estate market
and determines if and how the foreign investors in this
market differ from domestic investors.
The findings indicate a foreign interest in approximately
seven percent of the existing office supply in the Chicago
metropolitan area and nearly 10 percent in Chicago's central
business district. Although less than comparable estimates
in Los Angeles and Washington, D.C., the findings indicate
that foreign investors are active in the Chicago real estate
market. This participation by foreign investors, especially
Japanese investors,is likely to increase in the foreseeable
future.
Additional findings include the following: significant
differences exist among foreign investors active in the
United States; the longer foreign investors are active in
U.S. real estate, the more they appear to resemble domestic
investors; foreign investors have strong product
preferences; some foreign investors are willing to pay a
premium for some types of U.S. real estate; foreign
investors have a longer term view, foreign investors tend to
be more relationship oriented than domestic investors and;
foreign investors prefer to structure simple
transactions.
Thesis Supervisor: James McKellar
Title: Director, Center for Real Estate Development
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
PREFACE
Several cities in the United States tend to have a
disproportionate share of foreign investment in real estate,
most notably major cities on the Atlantic or Pacific coasts
such as New York, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and San
Francisco. Few studies published to date have attempted to
analyze why some cities have attracted more foreign
investment than others and if there are significant
differences in the way that foreign and domestic investors
behave within these markets. The focus of this study is to
determine the level and the nature of foreign investment
activity in one major city that appears to fall outside the
sphere of interest of these foreign investors, namely
Chicago. Secondarily, this study attempts to determine if
foreign investors in the Chicago market behave differently
than their domestic counterparts. This investigation is one
part of a larger study concurrently being conducted to
determine foreign investment activity in commercial
estate and the differences between foreign and domestic
investors in three U.S. markets: Chicago, Los Angeles, and
Washington D.C.
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real
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Significant differences exist among foreign investors
currently active in the United States, as is the case with
domestic investors. On one level these differences reflect
national cultural traits. Japanese investors look for
different types of investments than do Dutch investors. For
example, Japanese investors are not willing to purchase
suburban properties at this time although Dutch investors
are. On another level, foreign investors differentiate
themselves by investor type. Just as a U.S. pension fund is
different than a U.S. syndicator, a foreign pension fund
has different investment criteria and preferences than does
a foreign syndicator. These differences are more
significant than any commonalities that might be used to
generalize the form of foreign investment.
The longer foreign investors are active in U.S. real
estate, the more they appear to resemble domestic investors.
The differences that initially arise between foreign and
domestic investors with respect to product preference,
location preference, and risk posture tend to diminish over
time. As these differences diminish, transactions between
foreign and domestic parties begin to more closely resemble
those between domestic parties. For example, Dutch
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investors are willing to invest in suburban properties.
Sources report that when these investors began acquiring
U.S. real estate, they were not interested in suburban
properties. This is similar to the reluctance of Japanese
investors today. Japanese investors have only been major
players in U.S. real estate since the early 1980's and are
not willing to purchase properties in the suburbs at this
time.
Foreign investors of all nationalities and types
exhibit a strong preference for downtown, "class A" office
properties. Foreign entities have a cultural reference
point for downtown office properties. Furthermore, these
properties often command international recognition and are
perceived by foreign concerns to be less risky than
alternative investments.
Some foreign investors are willing to pay a premium
price for some types of U.S. real estate, but not for all
types of real estate. Not all properties sold to' foreign
entities are able to command high prices. Those that have
historically commanded higher prices are downtown and
landmark properties in major U.S. cities that are both well
located and substantially leased. Foreign entities will bid
lower on other types of properties with which they are
culturally unfamiliar or which they perceive to represent a
greater risk. Since there is little documented evidence of
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foreign purchases of residential, industrial, and suburban
properties, one can assume that foreign entities would bid
less for such properties since properties are sold to the
"highest bidder."
In a recent transaction in Chicago, RREEF purchased a
600,000 square foot downtown office building for $75
million, or $125 per square foot. A foreign investor has
recently agreed to purchase a downtown Chicago property for
over $250 per square foot which may set the precedent for
future investments in the market.
Foreign investors tend to have a longer-term view. In
other cultures, holding periods are traditionally longer
than they are in the United States and, as a result, there
are lower turnover rates. "Mitsubishi Estate Co., Japan's
largest owner of real property is said to have never sold a
major property in its 50-year history."2 Furthermore,
foreign entities consider the United States a safe haven for
capital and are interested in investing their capital in
this country for a longer period of time for capital
preservation purposes.
Foreign investors tend to be more relationship-oriented
than domestic investors. They tend to establish long-term
relationships and generally would prefer to deal directly
without the use of intermediaries. However, since they are
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unfamiliar with the United States and with the ways of doing
business, they like to align themselves first with an
intermediary who can aid them in their search for
investments and provide them assistance in negotiating with
domestic parties. This is the basis for what often is an
on-going relationship. With the exception of some of the
larger domestic insurance companies, who often deal time
after time with the same domestic real estate firms,
domestic firms tend to be more transaction-oriented than
foreign investors and do not depend heavily on relationships
with investment advisors.
Foreign investors tend to structure simpler
transactions, by American standards, on their purchases
because of the structures with which they are culturally
familiar, usually all- debt or all-equity. What often
results are all-cash purchases and straightforward deal
structures. For example, "investment vehicles, such as
limited or general partnerships, do not exist [in Japan] and
Japanese laws concerning similar Japanese entities are not
well developed... Real estate deals are almost never financed
on a non-recourse basis and the concept of the convertible
mortgage is unknown in the domestic context."3
Chicago is not currently a first choice for foreign
investment and most foreign entities who have invested in
this market have been active in other markets in the United
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States prior to pursuing investment opportunities in
Chicago. Foreign investment (excluding Canadian investment)
in existing office space in the Chicago metropolitan area
since the beginning of the decade amounts to roughly seven
percent of total office space in that metropolitan area. In
Los Angeles, foreign investment comprises 51 percent of
office space in the central business district, and in
Washington, D.C., foreign investment accounts for 12 percent
of the supply of office space.4, 5
Foreign investors are likely to be more willing in the
future to invest in Chicago properties. Foreign investors
in this market tend to favor downtown office buildings
although there are examples of foreign investment in both
suburban office properties and regional malls. As
opportunities in other popular foreign investment markets
become saturated, as prices in these markets continue to
increase, as foreign portfolios of U.S. real estate grow in
size, as familiarity with the Chicago market increases and,
as the Chicago market begins to show signs of recovery from
the current trend of overbuilding, it is expected that
foreign investment in this market will increase.
The Japanese are beginning to feel more comfortable
with Chicago. This indicates a likely increase in their
purchases in this market. In 1986, two projects were
announced involving Japanese investment in Chicago. One
transaction involved debt only. As of July, 1987, 10
additional projects have been identified representing
Japanese direct investment in downtown Chicago. Foreign
investment advisors and local brokers have also indicated
that the Japanese are actively studying the Chicago market
and seeking investment opportunities in the Chicago area.
There are opportunities for Chicago real estate
professionals desiring to tap foreign sources of capital in
this market. Specifically, there are opportunities for
developers, management firms, leasing agents, brokers, and
lawyers to interface with foreign interests in foreign
investment transactions in the Chicago area to generate fee
income from leasing and management of foreign owned
properties, to arrange favorable project financing, to
participate in joint venture arrangements with foreign
entities, to sell properties, or to act as an intermediary
between domestic sellers and foreign buyers of Chicago real
estate.
DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Foreign direct investment in this study includes only
commercial property transactions in which the foreign entity
involved has an equity investment. For the purpose of this
analysis, debt having the characteristics of equity is also
assumed to be an equity investment (i.e. participating or
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convertible mortgages).
Although Canadian investors have historically been and
continue to be quite active in property ownership and
development in the Chicago real estate market, preliminary
research indicates that Canadian firms are virtually
indistinguishable from domestic firms due to the length of
time that they have been active in U.S. real estate, their
proximity to the United States, as well as their long
standing affiliations with U.S. real estate firms.
Therefore, this study focuses on non-North American
investors. This is not to imply that Canadian equity
investments are not a significant force in the Chicago
market, but due to the limited time frame in which this
study was conducted, they have been excluded from the
research and analysis.
METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION
The analysis of foreign direct investment in Chicago
uses a case-study approach based on personal interviews,
on-site whenever possible. Initially, a sample of 26
transactions involving foreign entities that have taken
place in the Chicago market were identified through contacts
in the area. After identifying these specific transactions,
the American and foreign principals involved in these
transactions, the intermediaries associated with both
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parties to the deal, the prominent real estate professionals
involved on a local, Chicago level,and those involved in
real estate on a national level were interviewed when
possible at length. Over 50 people were contacted in
Chicago and in New York City by phone and in person. Using
these cases and the related interviews, the relative level
and nature of foreign investment activity in Chicago as well
as the perceived differences in foreign investment behavior
in the Chicago market were then deduced and analyzed.
As background, Chapter Two briefly summarizes and
discusses foreign investment activity of all types in the
United States.
Chapter Three introduces Chicago from a demographic,
economic, and a real estate perspective, both historically
and currently. It discusses the attraction of Chicago for
any investor, foreign or domestic, and compares Chicago with
other major cities in the country.
In addition to summarizing general foreign strategies
and objectives for U.S. real estate investment, Chapter Four
describes the foreign perception of the Chicago market,
specifically why certain foreign entities decided to invest
in this market.
After identifying general perceptions and strategies,
Chapter Five offers summary descriptions of four
transactions that have been closed in Chicago over the past
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several years that have involved foreign investors of
different nationalities and types. Three pending
transactions are also briefly discussed. This chapter
presents the fundamental aspects of the transactions
including the parties involved, the property description,
and the deal structure. These four cases and the
descriptions of the pending transactions highlight the
diversity of deals are currently being negotiated or that
that have been transacted over the past several years in
this market.
Americans often assume that foreign investors are
different from domestic investors. Identifying and
understanding these differences, when they occur, are
important for U.S. real estate professionals seeking to work
with foreign investors. Different cultures have different
preferences for product types, geographic regions, and deal
structures. Different cultures also behave differently with
respect to how they make decisions and what they are willing
to pay for U.S. real estate. Chapter Six addresses, from a
domestic perspective, how foreign investors are perceived to
be different from domestic investors in Chicago.
The final chapter offers analysis and conclusions of
the current foreign investment activity in Chicago,
highlights foreign investment trends and projections for
this city, and speculates on the opportunities created for
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real estate professionals in this market to tap foreign
sources of capital.
LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH
The field research was affected by severely constrained
time limitations, the reticence of field sources to divulge
information and provide specific facts on particular
transactions and, the continued reliance on often broad and
general opinions without the benefit of corroborating facts.
This paper was researched and produced over a two-month
period. Unfortunately, with such a limited time to cover a
broad subject, one can barely scratch the surface of foreign
investment in a market the size of Chicago. Therefore, the
work must be seen as a starting point with more fieldwork
required as a basis for more definitive conclusions.
In addition to the time limitation, information was
hard to assemble because of the difficulties in gathering
the data for this study. This seemed to be a problem
endemic to Chicago and not encountered by other researchers
in similar investigations in Washington, D.C. and Los
Angeles. From the outset, there were difficulties in
identifying property owned by foreign entities in the
Chicago area because of an Illinois state law that in
essence protects the anonymity of property owners and the
methods by which they own property. Protecting
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confidentiality of real estate transactions seems to be a
preoccupation of many companies and individuals in the
Chicago market. Furthermore, information was often
difficult to obtain from the advisors of foreign investors
because of the confidentiality of the fiduciary relationship
between advisors and their clients. Additionally, one
Chicago real estate professional suggested that the owners
of property in Chicago deliberately try to keep a low
profile, and there is often a long chain of intermediaries
involved that further disguises ownership of property.
Beyond that no clear reason was given for this apparent
obsession with anonymity.
This inability to access market information was not
solely a problem of this researcher. A prominent
international investment advisor has encountered similar
difficulties in gathering data in Chicago as is illustrated
by the following excerpt from a recent marketing study.
"Tracking major office building transactions in Chicago is
difficult because of the confidential nature of most deals
and also because the trust structure in the state of
Illinois limits the availability of information concerning
building ownership."6
Subsequent to identifying foreign-owned properties in
Chicago, there was often reluctance on the part of those
involved to divulge specific information regarding the
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transactions. It was also difficult to speak with "both
sides" of any given transaction. Many of the foreign
investors active in the Chicago market do not have offices
in the city nor do many maintain U.S. offices. Therefore,
much of the information on foreign perspectives and
strategies came out of conversations with international
advisors representing foreign clients. Whereas difficulties
such as these did exist to some extent in the other markets
being studied, they did not exist to the extent that they
did in Chicago.
Limited information on foreign investment in Chicago is
also partially due to the lack of such investment as
compared to other U.S. cities like New York, San Francisco,
Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C. In the related studies
that assess foreign investment activity in the Los Angeles
and Washington, D.C. markets, 27 transactions involving
foreign equity investment were identified in the Los Angeles
central business district, which has 28 million square feet
of space,7 and 70 such transactions were identified in
Washington, D.C.'s 58 million square foot CBD.8 In Chicago's
CBD, which has over 95 million square feet of space, there
were 19 transactions identified involving foreign
investors.
In many instances, the parties involved in the
transactions with foreign investors were not comfortable
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giving out information. In comparison to other markets,
Chicago real estate professionals seem to be more guarded in
disclosing market information. Whereas there were many
professionals in the Chicago market who were very helpful
and informative, there were equally as many who declined to
discuss specific transactions. This characterization of the
Chicago market is surprising given that the real estate
industry relies so heavily on the free exchange of
information. A guarded climate could account, in part, for
the lower level of interest by foreign investors in the
Chicago market.
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Chapter One
Endnotes
1Jones Lang Wooten Investment Research, The Downtown
Chicago Office Market Report, (November 1986), 18.
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Conference on Japanese Investment in U.S. Real Estate," (2
October 1986), 3.
3 Ibid, 3.
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United States Real Estate: Are They Really Different. A
Review of Activity in the Los Angeles Area" (M.S. thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1987).
S. John Hodge and S. Kent Roberts, "An Assessment of
Foreign Investors in the Washington, D.C. Real Estate
Market" (M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1987).
6 Jones Lang Wooten Investment Research, The Downtown
Chicago Office Market Report, (November 1986).
7 Smith and Whalen.
5 Hodge and Roberts.
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Chapter Two
AN OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE U.S.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
There has been an increasing amount of foreign
investment activity in the United States. Each year over
the past several years, annual foreign investment has
exceeded the previous year's investment. Foreign investment
in the United States is traditionally categorized as either
portfolio investment or direct investment. Portfolio
investments represent approximately 75 percent of total
foreign investment in this country and include investments
in various financial assets such as stocks and bonds,
mortgage related securities, and deposits in U.S. banks.
The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that foreign
entities invested $750.9 billion in U.S. portfolio
investments in 1985.1
According to U.S. Commerce Department statistics,
nearly 52 percent of foreign portfolio investments in the
United States are made by the western Europeans, the largest
source of foreign portfolio investments in this country.2
Ranked second largest in dollar volume of portfolio
investments in 1985 are the Japanese. Sean Burns, a
research economist with the Forecasting and Policy Analysis
20
Division of the National Association of Realtors, explains,
"The Japanese contribution alone is $30.5 billion. This
represents 25 cents of every dollar in foreign portfolio
investment in the United States." 3 Exhibit 1 identifies the
portfolio investment according to the nationality of the
investor.
The other general classification of foreign investment,
contributing 25 percent to the total foreign investment in
the United States, is direct investment.4 According to the
U.S. Commerce Department, foreign direct investment is
defined as "the direct or indirect ownership by a foreign
entity of 10 percent or more of the voting securities of an
incorporated business enterprise, and a 10 percent or more
interest in real property. "5
Foreign direct investment is difficult to estimate due
to the nature of reporting requirements in the United
States. For example, investments are often reported at book
value which disguises the market value of these investments
and other estimates rely on information from published
articles.
1985 Commerce Department estimates attribute $183
billion to foreign direct investment in 1985, an 11 percent
increase from 1984 investments.6 Exhibit 2 identifies the
amount of foreign direct investment according to the
nationality of the investor.
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FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. REAL ESTATE
Based on U.S. Commerce Department statistics, in 1980,
foreign investors of all types and nationalities purchased
$3.5 billion worth of U.S. real estate.7 Using U.S.
Commerce Department estimates,8 1985 foreign direct
investments in U.S. real estate ($18.6 billion) represent
approximately 10 percent of total 1985 foreign direct
investments in the U.S. According to estimates from Salomon
Brothers, Inc., compared to domestic investment in U.S. real
estate, foreign investment accounts for "slightly over one
percent of the total value of all developed real estate in
the United States. Hence, the total impact of foreign
investment in U.S. real estate is still relatively small in
comparison with the overall size of the market."9 Amounting
to $18.6 billion in 1985, direct foreign investment in real
estate represents approximately two percent of the total
foreign investment in the United States in this year. Total
foreign investment includes the $750.9 billion invested in
portfolio instruments and the $183 billion directly invested
by foreign entities in the United States in 1985.
Of all of the foreign investors who own property in
the United States, investors from Great Britain and the
Netherlands have invested the most capital on an annual
basis as Exhibit 3 illustrates. In the past several years
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the Japanese have increased their investments in the U.S.
dramatically.10 Much has been written about Japanese
investment in the past twelve months, and their acquisitions
of highly visible properties have drawn much press coverage.
However, Japanese investors were not major players in U.S.
real estate until the beginning of the 1980's and have
approached this country cautiously. Judging from the number
of transactions and the dollar amount of their purchases,
Japanese investors are definitely becoming increasingly
prominent actors in the U.S. real estate market. Japanese
investments in the United States have at least doubled from
1985 to 1986, and it is estimated that the Japanese invested
between $2.5 and $3 billion in U.S. real estate in 1986.11
Japanese investment is expected to double again in 1987,
during which time Japanese investors are expected to
purchase an additional $5 to $6 billion in U.S.
properties.12 Exhibit 4 illustrates annual Japanese real
estate investment in the United States since 1980.
Although much recent attention has focused on the
Japanese, it is important to remember that they are still
new players in the U.S. real estate market. Furthermore, in
annual investment and in total dollar volume, Japanese
investment has yet to surpass that of English and Dutch
investors. In 1985, Japanese investment slightly exceeded
one billion dollars. English investments in U.S. real
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estate totaled $4.6 billion in 1985 while Dutch investment
totaled $2.3 billion during this same period.13 However,
preliminary estimates for 1986 indicate that Japanese
investors will surpass both the Dutch and the English in
acquisitions of U.S. property this year, making the
Japanese, the largest source of foreign investment in U.S.
real estate in a given year.14 Exhibit 5 compares the
percentage of foreign investment in U.S. properties
according to the nationality of the investor in 1980 and
1986.
WHAT MAKES REAL ESTATE AN ATTRACTIVE INVESTMENT FOR
FOREIGNERS?
There are numerous published articles and reports
speculating why U.S. real estate is an attractive investment
for foreigners. Reasons consistently cited in these
articles include: 1 5
*Exchange Rate Differentials. A weak U.S. dollar,
compared to foreign currencies, increases foreign purchasing
power enabling investors to get more product for their
currency.
*Lack of Domestic Investment Opportunities. Foreign
countries, including Japan, The Netherlands, Germany, and
England, have few domestic real estate investment
opportunities. This is caused by the unavailability of
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product and the scarcity of developable land. For cultural
reasons, property owners in foreign countries hold
properties for longer periods of time than is common in the
United States. As a result, the turnover rate for
investment grade properties is low in foreign countries thus
limiting investment opportunities.
*Tax Advantages. The United States offers lower tax
rates than many foreign countries, with the exception of
Japan. This reduced rate can increase overall returns,
however measured, in U.S. real estate investments.
*Higher Yields. In many foreign countries yields on
real estate investments are lower than yields derived from
equity investment in U.S. real estate. In the United
States, owners of real estate can often capture yields
between 8 percent and 10 percent. According to analysts at
Jones Lang Wooten, yields in London average between 4 to 5.5
percent, in the Netherlands 6 to 6.75 percent, and in
Frankfort 5 percent.16 Clearly, sustained yields in excess
of those found in home markets would attract foreign
investors.
*The United States Trade Deficit. The United States
currently exports more than it imports which gives
foreigners U.S. dollars to spend. Trade surpluses coupled
with the lack of domestic investment opportunity and the
desire to preserve capital encourages foreign investment
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outside their countries. According to Arthur Mitchell, a
partner in the New York law firm Coudert Brothers, "Last
year [1986] Japan registered a $51 billion trade surplus
with the United States alone." 17
*The Political and Economic Stability of the United
States. The United States is considered by foreign
investors to be among the safest political and economic
havens in the capitalistic world; it is as a safe place to
invest and preserve capital for the long term.
*Portfolio Diversification. Investment in U.S. real
estate is often used as a portfolio diversification strategy
for foreign investors for many of the same reasons appealing
domestic investors. The size of the U.S. real estate
market, the largest in the free world, and the variety of
investment opportunities available within individual U.S.
markets provide ample diversification alternatives for
foreign and domestic investors.
*Globalization of the world's financial Markets.
This consists of the merger of the world's
financial and capital markets into a single global
capital market... Differential rates of
deregulation in major nations, plus differences in
the initial traits of their financial markets have
created large discontinuities and anomalies in the
process of merging these markets. These
discontinuities are generating many arbitrage
possibilities... The recent flow of foreign
capital int?8 U.S. real estate is part of such
arbitraging.
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From the statistics, it appears that foreign investment
of all kinds in the U.S. is significant in dollar amount and
is increasing in volume annually. However, relative to the
overall size of the U.S. real estate market, foreign direct
investment in real estate accounts for less than one
percent. Foreign investment in Chicago is an even smaller
component of total foreign investment in the United States
and of total foreign investment in real estate. Before
specifically analyzing foreign investment in Chicago, it is
necessary to understand the fundamentals of this market and
its attraction to investors.
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Chapter Three
CHICAGO: AN OVERVIEW
Chicago is often referred to as the "Windy City" and
"The City of Big Shoulders." Chicago is remembered for such
things as the 1871 Chicago Fire, the world's tallest
building - the Sears Tower, the antics of gangster Al
Capone, and "signature" architecture. Prior to 1987 when
Atlanta's airport volume exceeded that of Chicago's, O'Hare
International airport had the distinction of being the
busiest airport in the world.
There is far more to Chicago than this. Chicago
officially became a city on March 4, 1837, and its economy
has substantially grown and changed in its 150 year history.
Chicago is and has been for some time the commercial and
financial center for the midwest region of the United
States. As early as the 1850's, Chicago was known as the
commercial center for nanufacturing and transportation in
the nation's midsection. In 1849, the Chicago Board of
Trade was founded adding a new aspect of commerce to the
city.2 The volume of contracts traded on the Chicago Board
of Trade reached a record high in 1985. This volume was
more than the combined volume of the next three futures
exchanges - the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the Commodity
Exchange of New York, and the New York Mercantile Exchange. 3
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Chicago is also home to the Midwest Stock Exchange which is
the second largest stock exchange in the nation.4
CHICAGO DEMOGRAPHICS AND SIZE
Following New York, whose 1985 population was estimated
at 8.4 million, and Los Angeles, whose population was
estimated at 8.1 million in this same year, Chicago is
ranked the third largest metropolitan area in the United
States with an estimated 7.3 residents in 1985.5 According
to an analyst at Landaur and Associates, although it is less
than 2 percent per year and affected by the tremendous
migration from the "rust belt" to the sunbelt, Chicago's
population growth in the last decade [1970-1982] has
outpaced that of all major cities in the north and central
regions of the United States.
Chicago is situated on Lake Michigan and covers 4,654
square miles.6 Since approximately half of this land is
undeveloped, future expansion of the area has few physical
limitations other than Lake Michigan to the east.
According to census data, the median age of Chicagoans
is 29.8 years, younger than the national average of 30.3
years. In 1985, the median household income in the city of
Chicago was estimated from census data to be $19,667.7
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CHICAGO'S CHANGING ECONOMY
As in many northern urban areas at the turn of the
century, Chicago's economy rested upon manufacturing and
industry. However, in many of these cities, Chicago
included, the economic groundwork has shifted to the service
industries over the past decade.
More than a century ago, Chicago was perhaps best known
for its shipping services. Having the advantage of being
located in the center of the nation, the city was a
distribution point linking the East to the West. As a
transportation hub, Chicago has always prided itself on its
network of transportation facilities. According to the
Investment Research division of Jones Lang Wooten, "to
transport products across the continent, the city possesses
a network of airports, railroads, waterways, and expressways
that carry more passengers and cargo annually than any other
location in North or South America."8
Well before the turn of the century, Chicago became
known for industries such as meatpacking, manufacturing, and
steel making. Chicago was also a metropolis for agriculture
as well as the center for agricultural machinery.9 By the
1960's, Chicago's economic base was comprised of industries
such as metals, electric machinery, food processing,
nonelectrical machinery, fabricated metal products, chemical
and allied products, and printing and publishing.10 In 1987,
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Chicago continues to be ranked number one in gross
manufacturing sales in the nation.11
In the last decade, Chicago has experienced a dramatic
loss of manufacturing jobs. Both the steel-making industry
and the surrounding agricultural farms in the Midwest have
experienced troubled times. "The metropolitan area has lost
28,100 manufacturing jobs since 1984, but has made up for
this with gains in the whosesale/retail sector and in
service employment."12 During this same time period, service
sector employment in the Chicago metropolitan area has
increased. This sector currently provides 75% of all jobs
in Chicago according to estimates by Landaur and Associates.
Although this sector of the economy is expected to continue
to grow, this growth rate is diminishing slightly.13
Not only has Chicago's economy been transformed from
one which was traditionally based on manufacturing to one
that now is primarily a service center, Chicago is also
becoming better known as an international city and has
recently been aggressively marketing itself to international
firms.14 In addition to being home to almost 80 Fortune 500
companies,15 it is estimated by an analyst at Collins Tuttle
that Chicago is now home to nearly 90 of the top 100 banks
in the world. Jones Lang Wooten's Downtown Chicago Office
Market Report indicates that:
"The city's financial sector is based on banking
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and trade and has been rapidly expanding its
international scope. Commercial bank deposits
rose 13.8 percent over the past year [1985] to
reach more than $11.0 billion, making Chicago one
of the largest banking centers in the world...In
turn, many foreign banks have opened branches in
Chicago. The presence of Japanese financial
institutions is most pronounced with 16 branches
in Chicago, followed by Canada with 8, France with
7, Italy with 616 Great Britain with 5 and West
Germany with 4."1
With global banking an emerging trend, Chicago is well
situated to take advantage of these opportunities and to
expand its financial services to the region. Considering
its broad and diverse economy and its wide financial, trade,
and manufacturing base, Chicago provides a good location for
both domestic and international firms. According to Neil
Bluhm, president of JMB Realty, "Chicago has become a magnet
for foreign companies...The city is dealing with an
increasingly sophisticated marketplace." 17
In addition to finance, trade, and manufacturing,
Chicago is also nationally recognized for its retail
activity. In 1985, Chicago recorded $41.7 million in retail
sales and was ranked second behind Los Angeles, with
recorded retail sales of $51 million and ahead of New York
City, with retail sales valued at $41.4 million.1 8
34
THE REAL ESTATE MARKET IN CHICAGO
According to sources close to the market, over 13
million square feet of new office space was constructed in
Chicago during 1986. At the end of the first half of 1987,
the total office supply in the Chicago metropolitan area was
near 160.5 million square feet, making the Chicago
metropolitan area the third largest office market in the
country behind New York and Los Angeles whose metropolitan
office markets contain 429 and 282 million square feet of
space respectively.19 According to the Chicago Association
of Commerce and Industry, "data indicate the total value of
the Chicago area's real estate was more than $200 billion,
trailing only Los Angeles and New York."
According to real estate professionals active in the
Chicago market, vacancy rates are averaging close to 12
percent in downtown Chicago. In the Chicago suburbs, the
vacancy rate is substantially higher, reaching almost 20
percent. "The downtown Chicago vacancy rate has remained
below the national average over the past decade and
fluctuations in the vacancy rate over this period compare
very well with the trends experienced by most other U.S.
cities."20 With the amount of current construction activity,
national and local real estate analysts expect vacancy rates
to continue to rise further as more projects are completed.
Exhibit 6 illustrates vacancy trends in the Chicago office
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market.
Real estate brokers and analysts in Chicago report that
asking rents in downtown Chicago range from $24.00 to $30.00
per square foot, net of taxes and operating expenses, for
newly constructed class A office space. This compares to
asking rents of $22.00 to $25.00 in Los Angeles. Rents in
New York City are reported to be $50.00 per square foot and
increasing. One project in Washington, D.C. was asking
$45.00 per square foot although this is unusual in this
market. Rents in Washington, D.C. approximate those of
Chicago. Effective net rents in Chicago's central business
district generally average $16.00 to $18.00 per square foot,
a 20 to 30 percent reduction of the quoted rents.21 As in
other overbuilt markets across the United States,
concessions are common. According to an analyst at Landaur
and Associates, "the lease concession package today can
include as much as 2 years free rent on a 10-year lease,
$35.00 per square foot tenant build-out above building
standard, and buyout of an existing lease, or other cash
payment to tenant."
Industry professionals estimate the absorption of
office space in Chicago to be close to 2.5 million square
feet per year.22 Acording to a study recently conducted at
MIT, America's Office Needs 1985-1995, it will require 4.3
years to absorb the vacant space in the Chicago market.2 3
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Construction activity has been brisk in the Chicago
area. According to a report jointly published by the Center
for Urban Affairs and Policy Research at Northwestern
University and the Chicago Department of Planning, Downtown
Development: Chicago 1985-1986, during the last five years,
in excess of 20 million square feet of both new and
renovated space was completed in Chicago. According to this
same report, there are currently nine million square feet of
space under construction, and "during 1985-1986, $2.2
billion was invested in 148 new, adaptive re-use, or
renovation projects that were (or about to be) completed
within a growing downtown."2 4 Exhibit 7 illustrates
inventory, construction and renovation, absorption and
vacancy trends in the Chicago downtown market since 1984.
According to an office market study conducted by Jones
Lang Wooten, "Chicago, America's third largest urban
metropolis, lies at the cross-roads of the country. For
well over a century, it has been a transfer point for
transcontinental goods and travelers, as well as the
industrial, agricultural and transportation center of the
American Midwest. It has also become, in more recent years,
the country's leading center for finance and trading in
Midwestern commodities." 25
From a real estate investment perspective, Chicago is
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an attractive market. It is the third largest city in the
United States, it is the third largest office market in the
country, it is ranked first in gross manufacturing sales,
second in retail sales and has active stock and commodity
exchanges. There is also a major financial presence in
Chicago.
As are other real estate markets in the United States,
Chicago is overbuilt and vacancy rates are expected to climb
further in the years to come. With few physical or
artificial restraints on the supply of space, the market has
the potential to become more overbuilt than it currently is.
According to real estate advisors, foreign investors
initially assimilate and thoroughly examine fundamental
demographic, economic, and real estate trends in a market
prior to any site specific investment analysis. Whereas the
preliminary analysis may indicate that Chicago is a healthy
and attractive market for investment, it is necessary to go
beyond these factors and determine on what basis foreign
investors enter this market.
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Chapter Four
WHY CHICAGO?
PERCEPTIONS AND STRATEGIES
WHY THE U.S.?
Deciding to invest in Chicago is one part of a broader
strategy to invest in the United States. As was briefly
mentioned in Chapter Two, there are several macro-economic
reasons why foreign investors choose to place large sums of
capital, which totaled $18.4 billion in 1985 according to
Commerce Department statistics, in U.S real estate.
To summarize, these macro-economic factors influencing
foreign investment activity in the United States include:
(1) the diverse U.S. economy, (2) the exchange rate
disparities, (3) the lack of investment opportunities in
foreign real estate markets, (4) the higher yields often
obtained by investing in U.S. real estate compared to
alternative real estate investments in other countries, (5)
the political and economic stability of the United States,
and (6) the size and diversity of the U.S. real estate
market which presents opportunities to foreign investors to
satisfy their portfolio diversification objectives.
The importance of these various reasons for foreign
investment in U.S. real estate varies not only according to
the nationality of the investor, but also according to the
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investor type. Beyond these macro-economic conditions that
make U.S. real estate investment appealing to foreign
investors, there are a multitude of investment opportunities
in the United States from which investors must choose. A
fundamental decision that these off-shore investors must
contemplate is: In what city should this investment take
place?
WHY CHICAGO?
According to several international real estate
advisors, foreign investors initially study the entire
United States carefully and cautiously making comparisons
between the different regions and major cities within these
regions prior to targeting certain cities for investment.
Although current patterns of investment do not seem to bear
out this kind of analysis because more than market facts
influence where to invest, these advisors feel that foreign
investors try to get an overall feel for the United States
before formulating overall investment strategies and
pursuing specific investments. Given that the acquisition
of U.S. real estate is an attractive investment vehicle for
foreign capital, there are clearly some U.S. cities that
seem to be more appealing to foreign investors than others
given the large amount of investment activity generated in
these cities. For example, rough estimates indicate that
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foreign equity investment represents 51 percent of the
office space in the Los Angeles central business district,
and that foreign equity investment represents 12 percent of
the Washington, D.C. central business district.2' 3' Exhibit
8 identifies the regions of the United States that have been
primary investment choices for foreign investors.
Until recently, foreign investment has been primarily
bi-coastal; that is, concentrated in major metropolitan
areas on both coasts of the United States. The author knows
of no studies to date that have determined the dollar amount
of foreign investment in Chicago or any studies that have
compiled a list of transactions involving foreign investors
in this market. Rough estimates from the Chicago
Association of Commerce and Industry speculate that foreign
investment in Chicago could be as much as 15 percent ($900
million) of the $6 billion in total 1985 investment in new
buildings.
Using the property data gathered for this study-, out of
160.5 million square feet of office space in the Chicago
metropolitan area, almost 11 million square feet, or
slightly over seven percent, of existing office property can
be attributed to foreign equity investment. In the Chicago
central business district, there is evidence of foreign
investment in approximately 10 percent of the existing
supply of office space. These are very crude estimates due
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to the time limitations of the study and to the limited
amount of data that was available because of the limitations
discussed in Chapter One. No attempt was made to
statistically verify the results. There is no doubt these
estimates would be greater if Canadian investment had been
included. Square footage was not available for all of the
projects identified. In such cases, an average of 500,000
square feet was substituted for the actual square footage.
Furthermore, the estimate does not reflect partial interests
retained by domestic joint venture partners since most often
the percentage of partial interests was not known.
The absolute accuracy of the number is not as
significant as its relative importance. Whereas estimates
indicate that foreign investment in the Chicago metropolitan
area is less than that in Washington, D.C. or in Los
Angeles, these estimates do indicate the presence of foreign
investors in the Chicago market. There is no doubt that
there are additional properties owned wholly or partially by
foreign investors that have been overlooked.
There are additional problems in estimating equity
investment. It is very difficult to track capital flows.
Although on the surface, there appears to be a prevalence of
transactions involving all-cash purchases in Chicago, there
is no way to determine if these properties have been
financed either overseas or domestically subsequent to the
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initial investment.
According to those interviewed, foreign investors
choose to invest in Chicago properties for many of the same
reasons that they choose to invest in other cities. These
reasons include Chicago's size, its economy, and its
attractive investment opportunities, the same factors that
influence domestic investors.
The Size of the Market. Compared to other U.S.
cities, Chicago is ranked third largest in terms of
population.4 Downtown Chicago's office market is the second
largest in the United States, having 95 million square feet
of space.5 Since the majority of foreign investment has been
limited to the largest cities in the United States, it seems
that the size of a city holds some importance for foreign
investors. However, as statistics indicate, and as
illustrated by Exhibit 9, even though Chicago is ranked
third in size, Chicago does not appear to be ranked third in
appeal to foreign investors.
Saturation of Alternative Markets. According to
foreign investors and international advisors, there appear
to be economic reasons motivating foreigners to invest in
Chicago. As a result of the recent investment activity on
the coasts, prices of and competition for prime commercial
properties have increased in these markets. Real estate
industry analysts believe that these markets are now
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becoming saturated as well as expensive. Chicago, on the
other hand, offers foreign investors opportunities to invest
in U.S. real estate at lower absolute prices per square foot
than they would pay in Los Angeles, New York, or Washington,
D.C., their current favorites.
A recent study of Chicago's office market conducted by
Jones Lang Wooten Investment Research reports that "Quality
buildings at prices averaging between $100 and $150 per
square foot are beginning to attract foreign capital seeking
stable, long-term investments that many regard as a 'better
buy' when compared to similar buildings in Manhattan that
have been selling for more than twice as much."6
Japanese investors are currently negotiating to
purchase two downtown office buildings in Chicago.
"Building Number One" was completed in the early 1980's and
is selling for slightly over $130 per square foot.
"Building Number Two" was completed one year ago and the
Japanese investor has agreed to pay almost $270 per square
foot for a 50 percent interest in the project. Even at
almost $270 per square foot, this seems cheap compared to
sales prices that generally fall into the $300 to $500 range
in both Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles. Unfortunately,
there is not enough sales data to determine sales price
patterns in this market. However, foreign investors appear
willing to pay a broad range of prices for properties in the
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market.
Diverse Economy. In addition to the size of Chicago
and the recent sales prices of property in the market, which
are assumed to be less expensive in comparison to
alternative investment opportunities in other cities,
foreign investors invest in Chicago because of its broad and
diverse economy. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Chicago has
a diverse and mixed economy. Many real estate investors,
domestic and foreign, have felt the recent sting from their
investments in single-industry towns, such as Denver and
Houston, where vacancy rates have soared due to the
depression in the oil industry. In a May, 1987, Real Estate
Forum article, Daniele Bodini, president of American
Continental Properties Group, reports "Many major
institutions invested in what they considered to be the
'blue chip' properties in the sunbelt cities only to see the
asset value of their buildings drop considerably."7
Established International Presence. The number of
international firms with offices in Chicago indicates
foreign interest in the area. As mentioned in Chapter
Three, there is a growing international component to the
city's economy due in part to the growth in the
international banking and services sectors. This produces a
corresponding demand for additional office space and
increased foreign recognition of the city. Deregulation of
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banking systems around the world has contributed to an
emerging global banking system. This enables foreign banks
to compete with domestic banks in the provision of services
to domestic clients.
Although the number of international firms that have
offices in Chicago is increasing, preliminary research
indicates that there are no foreign real estate companies
with offices in Chicago. Most foreign investors who own
property in Chicago base their U.S. real estate operations
out of New York City or Los Angeles, where they currently
own property or are actively pursuing acquisitions, if they
have offices in the United States at all. The presence of
offices seems to be directly related to investment activity
in the area. It does not make sense, from an economic
standpoint, to staff an office unless there is enough
activity to justify the expense. Furthermore, offices of
international investment advisors are not prevalent in
Chicago. According to these advisors in New York City, many
of these firms are establishing, re-establishing, or
expanding their Chicago branches which is a possible
indication of increasing foreign investment interest in
Chicago.
Product. Foreign investors have a noted preference for
high profile, "signature" products. These are buildings
thought to be well-located and having notable architecture
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or other features. Many of the transactions in Chicago have
involved what local and national real estate professionals
consider prestige and landmark properties. In addition to
being "high profile", these properties, with the exception
of new construction, are also more often than not
substantially leased to credit tenants. In the case of
development transactions, there is often a preleasing
requirement as a prerequisite for foreign involvement as
many U.S. markets, including Chicago, are becoming
overbuilt. Recent development projects to which foreign
investors have contributed equity have minimum pre-leasing
requirements of 30 percent. Therefore, the availability of
what foreigners consider to be investment-grade properties
contributes to the amount of foreign investment activity in
Chicago.
Familiarity. Prior to investment, foreign investors
must not only be familiar with, but also comfortable with a
market. Recognition becomes an important component of
foreign investment when domestic approval is required prior
to investment. In Japan, all investments by Japanese life
insurance companies, trust banks, and pension funds must be
approved by the Ministry of Finance. Other foreign
countries also have various domestic approval requirements.
Foreign pension fund investments usually need to be ratified
by a board of directors. Disparities in the amount of
49
properties owned by different foreign investors in Chicago
may be the result of some foreign countries being more
familiar with Chicago. English, Dutch, and German investors
have had a presence in the Chicago market since prior to the
beginning of the decade. Japanese investors, however, have
only been publicly active in Chicago since 1986.
Personal Networks. According to those involved in
transactions with foreign investors in Chicago, foreign
investors enter Chicago on the basis of relationships and
personal networks. Investors are introduced to Chicago and
to investment opportunities in this market through both
existing and new relationships, directly and indirectly.
Various intermediaries often bring domestic sellers and
foreign investors together. Intermediaries that have been
involved in transactions in Chicago include: (1) local and
national brokers acting on behalf of both buyers and
sellers, (2) international advisors and consultants, (3)
investment bankers, (4) lawyers, (5) institutions such as
life insurance companies and foreign and domestic banks, and
(6) previous joint-venture partners.
Domestic real estate investors also use various
intermediaries, but to a lesser extent. Most of the larger
domestic investors have in-house departments responsible for
identifying acquisition opportunities, analyzing markets and
investments, and closing transactions.
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Foreign investors initially retain intermediaries to
obtain market information and investment advice in markets
with which they may not yet be familiar or to aid in the
negotiation and structuring of transactions. These
intermediaries are often retained after the transaction has
closed to monitor investments, to search for additional
investment opportunities, and/or to help develop investment
strategies for the foreign entity. Some foreign investors
make more use of intermediaries than others. This is
largely dependent on the foreign investors' knowledge of
markets and U.S. business practices which in turn is
dependent on the length of time they have been active in the
United States. In Chicago, a majority of the foreign
investors have dealt primarily with intermediaries in New
York City, who in turn have established the local contacts
and relationships in Chicago on behalf of their foreign
clients.
Intermediaries are not always involved in Chicago
transactions between domestic real estate entities and
foreign investors. In some instances, property was marketed
directly to foreign concerns by domestic sellers. This
practice of direct contact and negotiation may become more
commonplace over time as relationships are established
between domestic and foreign parties.
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Chicago is similar in size, economy, and product to
other cities that have attracted foreign investors. In
addition to these reasons, foreign investors enter this
market as the result of industry networking. These factors
are not unique to the Chicago market as all of these
elements are present in other markets such as New York and
Los Angeles. One feature that differentiates Chicago from
other markets is its location. Situated in the middle of
the United States, Chicago offers foreign investors who are
heavily invested in coastal cities a chance to diversify
their holdings of U.S. property. Additionally, Chicago
offers off-shore investors proximity to industry, some of
which is foreign-owned.
Portfolio Diversification. Chicago provides foreign
investors, whose investments are heavily concentrated in one
region of the United States, an opportunity to
geographically diversify their portfolio of U.S. real
estate. Domestic firms often diversify real estate
portfolios in this manner as well.
Proximity to Industry. With Chicago considered the
capital of a region dominated by industry, foreign investors
have opportunities to invest in real estate that is close to
industry, especially to the foreign manufacturing plants.
With several Japanese auto and electronics plants located in
the central United States, investment in Chicago offers
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these investors proximity to these investments. As more of
these facilities are established, familiarity with the
region is also likely to increase.
Why Chicago? Not unlike the reasons foreign investors
cite for investing in other U.S. cities, foreign investors
express interest in Chicago because of its size, economy,
and product. Personal relationships also attract foreign
investors to the city, as well as opportunities for
portfolio diversification and the opportunity to be close to
foreign industry.
WHY NOT CHICAGO?
Since Chicago is similar to other U.S. markets in which
there is a demonstrated interest by foreign investors, why
then is it not considered by real estate analysts and
foreign entities to be a "tier one" choice for investment?
Even though Chicago is the third largest city in the United
States and has a diverse economy in addition to
investment-grade property, many real estate professionals on
both a local, Chicago level and a national level
nevertheless feel that this alone is not enough to stimulate
foreign acquisitions of property in this area.
As of July, 1987, according to those interviewed, some
foreign investors continue to express concern, and most
remain cautious, regarding investment in the Chicago market.
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Reasons frequently given by both domestic real estate
professionals and foreign concerns for why there is not a
greater volume of foreign investment in this market include
the unavailability of product (stemming from property
ownership traditions in Chicago and from domestic
competition), the softness of the market, unfamiliarity with
the area, and the perception of risk in the market.
"Things Just Aren't Changing Hands." Many of the
domestic sources interviewed emphasize that Chicago is
"owned" by the major U.S. life insurance companies. One
real estate professional commented, "It seems that there are
not enough buildings to fit what they [foreign investors]
want that aren't already owned by deep pocket owners."
Industry analysts speculate this ownership pattern produces
a lack investment-grade property turnover in the Chicago
metropolitan area. Whether this is a real or a perceived
lack of product in Chicago cannot be substantiated from the
data collected since only properties with foreign ownership
were identified. Real estate analysts in the market report
property sales are not frequent occurrences in Chicago.
However, according to a Jones Lang Wooten Chicago office
market report, at least seven properties have been sold
recently in downtown Chicago. Others in the industry
speculate that the "Chicago mentality" of property ownership
is to "build, mortgage, and hold."
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The Soft Market. According to real estate
professionals active in the Chicago market, there appears to
be a disinclination to sell properties at this time. This
is attributed partially to the softness of the market. In
addition to the previously mentioned current ownership
trends in the market, analysts and property owners feel that
the reluctance of property owners to dispose of property
stems from the inability to receive adequate returns on
properties due to the high vacancy producing a corresponding
flat rent scale. One real estate professional speculates,
"There is more talk than deals" in Chicago and another
professional added, "Things just aren't changing hands."
Without product for sale, there are no investment
opportunities available to foreign investors who want to
acquire real estate in Chicago.
Twelve percent vacancy rates in Chicago, compared to
cities like Washington, D.C. and New York City whose vacancy
rates are currently 9.9 percent and 9.8 percent, 9- further
suppress foreign investment. An environment where the
supply of space exceeds demand less appealing to those
foreign investors who are looking for safe, risk-free
investments that will produce a steady cash flow. Many
foreigners are not comfortable with nor are they willing to
take leasing risks, and the high vacancy rates in the market
often signal increased risk to foreign investors.
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In addition to the "Chicago
mentality of property ownership" and the soft market, a
reason given frequently by real estate professionals
explaining why Chicago has not been a more popular choice
for foreign investors is that the city is not yet as well
known in the foreign countries from which the investment
capital originates. According to those who represent
foreign clients, Chicago is not a "port city." As mentioned
previously, one of the reasons that foreign investors invest
in a city is in part due to recognition. One real estate
professional working with Dutch investors commented that
Chicago is the most underrated city by foreigners primarily
due to their unfamiliarity with the city.
What makes many of the "popular" investment cities
attractive to foreign investors is that these cities are
familiar not only to the U.S.-based representatives of the
foreign companies, but also to those who must approve the
transactions in their home countries. Foreigners "know"
Washington, D.C. because it is the capitol of the United
States. Foreigners also recognize New York City as a world
financial capitol. There is a large Japanese population in
Los Angeles which contributes to Japanese recognition of
that city. Clearly, because Chicago is landlocked and
ranked third it does not command the same recognition as do
these other cities. It is much easier to sell an investment
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Lack of Familiarity.
"back home" if it is in a city known there, because in
essence, only one "sale" needs to be made; that of the
property itself. When those that approve transactions are
not familiar with the market, an additional "sale" needs to
be made; that of the city. It is possible once Chicago
becomes better known, together with the other factors making
investment in this market attractive, foreign investment
activity will increase.
Domestic Competition. Industry professionals speculate
that competition for properties also limits foreign
investment in Chicago. Currently, many feel pension funds
and life insurance companies, both domestic and foreign, are
competing for the same types of investment properties. In
addition to the competition, one professional suggested
that, in Chicago, it is much easier to submit properties to
domestic firms because these domestic firms maintain offices
in the city, whereas access to foreign entities can be
difficult. To tap foreign sources of capital, the domestic
party must approach a foreign investor directly or through
an intermediary in New York City. Additionally, if domestic
investors have the ability to respond more quickly to
investment opportunities than do foreign investors, foreign
investors may miss out on investments in Chicago.
Another form of domestic competition about which
investment advisors express concern is the lack of supply
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restraints in the Chicago market. Development in Chicago is
neither physically restrained, because of the large amount
of undeveloped land, nor artificially restrained through
zoning or development controls. Because of the potential
for competition without rigid restrictions on supply,
foreign investors perceive more risk in this market over the
long run. In both Los Angeles and in Washington, D.C.,
there are restraints on supply resulting from stringent
zoning regulations and development controls imposed by those
cities. Although there are some development controls in
Chicago, they are not nearly as restrictive as in other
cities. For example, due to various restrictions in the
Washington, D.C. market, it is estimated that in 12 years
there will be no remaining space on which to build. 10 With
restrictions on supply, foreign investors are assured that
their properties will remain occupied and therefore generate
the projected cash flows.
Distance Relative to Alternate Investment
opportunities. Although Chicago has the second busiest
international airport in the world, Chicago is still more
difficult to get to, from a time standpoint, than other U.S.
cities on either coast. For a foreign investor to get to
Chicago, the trip from home is at least three hours longer;
therefore, foreign investors tend to keep their interests
"closer to home" and in better-known cities.
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There is little doubt that there are good reasons for
foreign investors to invest in the Chicago real estate
market. There are equally as many conflicting reasons
explaining why foreign investment activity has not reached
the levels it has in other U.S. cities. Specific
strategies of foreign investors give additional insight on
what basis they may enter this market.
FOREIGN STRATEGIES FOR U.S. INVESTMENT IN COMMERCIAL REAL
ESTATE: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Foreign investment in real estate is expected to
increase nationwide. Japanese investment alone is expected
to double in 1987.12 According to their advisors, foreign
entities, such as English and Dutch investors, who have held
property for some length of time are beginning to re-examine
their portfolios of U.S. properties and either refinance
these properties or sell them. The traditional markets seem
to remain strong as top locational investment choices for
foreign investors. Those that represent foreign clients
also commented that investments in the sunbelt are no longer
of interest due to the failing economies of many of these
cities. Foreign investors instead are focusing on markets
that have a broad and diverse economic base which they feel
are able to sustain fluctuations in different sectors of the
economy.
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Development There is increasing evidence that many
foreign investors are becoming involved in development
ventures as opposed to investing exclusively in existing
properties.13 Of the 26 transactions identified in Chicago,
seven represent investments in development projects, two of
which are hotel properties. Industry professionals
speculate that development opportunities may increase in
attraction to foreign investors because of foreign
investors' inability to locate existing products, their
increasing familiarity and comfort with both domestic
markets and joint-venture partners, and their inability to
continue to compete for prime properties.
For foreign investors who are having difficulty
locating existing investment property, development
opportunities in most markets are abundant. In 1986, 13
million square feet of space was developed in Chicago. An
additional 5.2 million square feet of space is expected to
come on line in 1988 and 1989.14 Domestic developers often
look to foreign sources of capital for debt and/or equity
financing. Foreign investors who participate in development
ventures can mitigate their exposure to risk by negotiating
master leases, pre-leasing requirements, preferred returns,
and convertible debt. All of these types of arrangements
have been negotiated in transactions between foreign and
domestic parties in Chicago. Joint ventures with domestic
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firms also allow foreign concerns to participate in and to
learn about U.S. development and markets through their
affiliation with an experienced partner. Participating in
development projects enables foreign investors to take
advantage of opportunities to increase their knowledge and
understanding of the market, to secure a low-risk position,
to obtain acceptable yields, and to invest in prime
property. Industry sources were quick to comment that many
foreign investors are beginning to realize if they want to
own "the best," they are going to have to "get in" at the
development stage.
Suburbs Some real estate industry analysts project a
trend of foreign investment in the suburbs.15 This is most
likely, however, for investors from those countries who have
a cultural reference point for suburban development or those
investors who are familiar with the United States. In
Chicago, there are Dutch, German, English, and Middle
Eastern investments in suburban office properties and
regional malls.
Suburban investment is not popular among all foreign
investors. The Japanese have yet to invest in the Chicago
suburbs. One Japanese investor who was interviewed
speculated that the Japanese will have to eventually enter
the suburban markets as opportunities to invest in major
cities become less frequent. However, downtown properties
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are the preferred investment for most foreign investors
because they feel these are safer investments because
downtowns exhibit stronger recovery trends following
soft-market conditions. A foreign investor's willingness to
invest in suburban properties is a function of cultural
familiarity with the suburbs and the risk posture of the
foreign investor. Both of these factors are largely
determined by the length of time the investor has been
active in the United States.
Financing An alternative to direct equity investment in
real estate that has been popular in the past and continues
to be prevalent in today's real estate markets is foreign
debt financing. This mitigates the risk to the foreign
investor. One Chicago real estate executive commented that
this is attractive to both sides of the transaction: the
domestic firm is able to obtain low cost financing, often
100 basis points below domestic financing, and the foreign
entity is able to assume less risk in the real estate
investment.
Landaur and Associates states in a June, 1987 report:
Japanese banks have earmarked tens of billions of
dollars for financing commercial property in the
U.S. They have captured the $50 million-plus
segment of the commercial mortgage market because
of higher lending limits, quicker loan closings,
and rates just below those offered by American
banks. According to industry experts, as of the
spring of 1987, there are no more than five to 10
single-source U.S. lenders willing to bid on
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quality real estate deals of $100 million or more,
while 20 Japaggse banks stand ready to quickly
submit offers.
FOREIGN STRATEGIES FOR REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT IN CHICAGO
A majority of those interviewed consistently repeated
one major point: Chicago is currently being closely
monitored by foreign investors and their advisors. Most of
these advisors are predicting an emerging trend of increased
foreign investment in the city. There is evidence that
international advisors and investment bankers are expanding
or establishing offices in the market to service the
requirements of their foreign clients. Whereas the real
estate market is considered by real estate industry analysts
to be overbuilt and therefore weak at the present time, they
do not consider Chicago to be as overbuilt as other U.S.
real estate markets, namely the cities in the "oilpatch"
region (Texas, Oklahoma, and Colorado) of the United States
whose average metropolitan vacancy rates have soared to 31.9
percent. Both domestic real estate professionals and
foreign investors feel foreign investment activity should
substantially increase as excess supply is absorbed and as
foreign familiarity with the market increases, providing
there is product for sale.
Since the beginning of 1987, there has been a dramatic
increase in Japanese investment in Chicago's central
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business district. Since late 1986, four projects have been
announced involving Japanese capital. These projects are:
the Nikko Hotel; Xerox Center; Prudential Plaza One and Two;
and 101 North Wacker Drive. Reports suggest this is merely
the tip of the iceberg. When contacted, representatives of
major Chicago real estate companies admitted to being
involved with various Japanese investors in current
negotiations. However, since these transactions have not
been finalized, the properties cannot be publicly disclosed
or the specifics of the transactions discussed at this time.
Seven such transactions, all located in downtown Chicago,
were identified. If completed, these transactions will
represent foreign investment in more than 5.5 million square
feet of space.
Of the 26 recent transactions in the Chicago market
involving foreign sources of capital, nine are development
projects, one is a renovation project, and seven are
suburban properties. Twenty-three out of the 26 properties
are office buildings, two are hotel projects that, when
completed, will add over 1,000 rooms to the cities existing
supply of 20,000 rooms,18 and three of the recent foreign
equity investments in the Chicago metropolitan area are in
regional malls.
There is not universal agreement 'among real estate
experts regarding the status of Chicago as an existing or as
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a potential target city for foreign equity investment. Some
industry sources do not consider Chicago a primary city for
foreign investment at this time. Others report that the
Chicago real estate market is being closely studied, and
that Chicago properties are being actively sought by foreign
investors. Both Japanese and Dutch investors have recently
added Chicago to their lists of target cities, according to
representatives of these foreign investors. With the
exception of one foreign investor active in Chicago, the
foreign investors who own property in the Chicago
metropolitan area have real estate investments in other
cities, primarily coastal cities. The one exception to
this, a Japanese investor who does not currently own
property in one of the favorite investment cities, said that
his company's investment in Chicago resulted not because
Chicago was a first choice, but rather because his firm was
unable to locate investments in the other major cities. In
the process of seeking real estate investments in the United
States, the opportunity to invest in Chicago was presented
to this firm by a Japanese bank. It was only after being
approached by this Japanese bank that the Japanese investor
began to study the Chicago market.
Partially due to the recent presence of Japanese
investors, many professionals interviewed believe Chicago
may be becoming a first tier city for foreign investors.
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Judging from the seven known transactions currently being
negotiated, there appears to be foreign interest in real
estate investment in Chicago. In addition to foreign
investors pursuing investments within the market, there are
several U.S. firms who are currently marketing property in
Chicago to foreign investors. For example, JMB, which is
headquartered in Chicago, has recently set up an office in
Tokyo hoping to attract foreign investment. Chicago is
perceived by both domestic and foreign parties to be an
attractive investment environment. There are definite
reasons why foreign investors would want to invest in
Chicago. They include the following: its size; its diverse
economy; the saturation of alternative investment
opportunities; the established international presence in
Chicago; product availability; its international
recognition; personal networks; portfolio diversification
opportunities and; proximity to industry. Acknowledged
strategies and recent investment behavior seem to indicate
that foreign investment in the Chicago metropolitan area
will increase in the foreseeable future. However, as
Chapter Five clearly indicates, just as there is no such
thing as a "typical" domestic investor, there is no such
thing as a typical foreign investor or a typical deal
structure in the Chicago market.
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Chapter Five
EXAMPLES OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE CHICAGO MARKET
The initial data-gathering for this analysis focused on
identifying specific Chicago properties owned wholly or
partially by foreign investors which were purchased from
1980 to the present. Every attempt was made to identify as
many foreign-owned properties in Chicago as possible.
However, there is no doubt that there are ommissions in the
data. Whereas, due to the limitations discussed in Chapter
One, it is impossible to report on the universe of
transactions that have closed in this market, the following
four cases and the three pending transactions were chosen to
highlight the diversity of deals that have taken place over
the past five years or about to take place in Chicago.
Although 26 foreign-owned properties were identified, in
many instances, because of the issue of confidentiality,
there was a corresponding difficulty in obtaining specific
information with respect to the transactions. In those
cases where confidentiality was an issue, the identities of
the parties involved in the transaction and the properties
have been ommitted. Exhibit 10 lists the 26 transactions
involving foreign investors in Chicago.
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THE PLAYERS
Although English, Dutch, German, and Middle Eastern
investors have all been active in the Chicago market at
least since the beginning of this decade, the recent foreign
investment activity has been primarily Japanese, as is
indicated by Exhibit 10, paralleling their activity in the
rest of the nation, although to a lesser extent.
As with foreign investment in the United States in
general, the players in Chicago have changed over time. The
current players at any given time are those with capital.
In the 1970's, both nationally and in the Chicago market,
because of oil prices, Middle Eastern investors were active.
In the early 1980's, Western European investors dominated
foreign investment in real estate. Currently, in the mid to
late 1980's, Japanese entities are the new wave of foreign
investors pursuing U.S. real estate investments.
In addition to investors representing different foreign
countries involved in Chicago real estate, the types of
foreign investors in this market are a diverse group and
include: wealthy individuals, pension funds, life insurance
companies, construction companies, pooled funds and
consortiums. Most foreign investors in the Chicago market
prefer to keep a very low profile, as do the domestic
investors in this market. Looking at such a diverse group
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both in terms of nationality and investor type makes
generalizations on foreign investors in Chicago not only
difficult but also inappropriate.
CASE STUDY #11. 55 WEST WACKER DRIVE
In November, 1986, 55 West Wacker Drive was sold to a
Dutch investment firm, Wilma Realty, Inc., after three
months of arms- length negotiation with Combined
International, a U.S. insurance company. The property was
originally under contract to a domestic real estate company,
(Julius) Trump Interests, who then approached Wilma for
equity financing. Sources suggest Trump and Wilma had a
previously established relationship in other real estate
ventures. When Trump subsequently changed its mind about
the purchase, Wilma, having already committed to an equity
participation in the deal, stepped in to become the sole
purchaser of this property.
55 West Wacker is a 200,000 square foot office
building. Now 18 years old, this building was originally a
single-tenant building, first as the headquarters of Blue
Cross and Blue Shield and later as Combined International's
headquarters. Although a prominent building in a
prestigious location in Chicago's central business district,
the building was sold by Combined International because
their demand for additional space could not be accommodated
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on the existing site. They currently lease 300,000 square
feet in a building completed in 1986.
The building was appraised at $22 million and was
initially marketed to single-tenant users at an asking price
of $26 million. According to an intermediary involved in
the sale, potential single-tenant users expressed little
interest in purchasing the building at the time because the
lease concessions available in the market made leasing a
more economical alternative to equity investment. According
to this same professional, domestic investors were also
interested in acquiring the property and, like Wilma,
submitted bids at deeply discounted prices from the original
asking price of $26 million. Wilma's offer to purchase the
property was $16 million, the most attractive offer made.
Wilma Realty is in the process of completing the
renovation of this formerly single-tenant building to a
multi-tenant speculative office building. In addition to
the $16 million purchase price, sources in the market
speculate the renovation will cost as much as the property.
Contributing to the overall costs of the renovation is the
complete removal of the asbestos in the building. Although
not required by law, the new owners insisted on removing
even the VAT flooring which contains insignificant amounts
of asbestos. As of June, 1987, there seemed to be much
interest in the building but, as the leasing agent for the
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property reported, there are no signed lease commitments for
any space. One local real estate executive speculated this
investment represents the riskiest venture undertaken by a
foreign investor in the Chicago market.
After purchasing 55 West Wacker, Wilma retained a local
real estate firm to co-develop, lease, and manage the
building. Recently, Wilma sold a 50 percent interest in the
building to a Dutch real estate investment trust, VIB N.V.
"VIB N.V. is an open-end real estate investment company with
the tax status of an investment trust. The shares of VIB
are quoted and traded on the official market of the
Amsterdam stock exchange."1
55 West Wacker represents Wilma's first and only
purchase in the Chicago area. The company has other U.S.
real estate investments in Atlanta, Miami, and Los Angeles
and has been active in U.S. real estate for 10 years. The
president of Wilma said that they had no plans to pursue
additional investments in Chicago until they see the-outcome
of 55 West Wacker. Not only was this Wilma's first
acquisition in Chicago but, a representative from Combined
International said that this was Combined International's
first real estate venture making it difficult for him to
speculate on differences in foreign investor behavior.
In addition to the development, management and leasing
services provided by Klaff Realty, Wilma has retained the
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services of another local real estate firm to monitor the
construction, leasing and management of the property. The
executive vice president of Klaff Realty, who at first was
skeptical of the involvement of another party, said that the
relationship has proved particularly beneficial and has
expedited the decision making process substantially.
CASE STUDY #2: PRUDENTIAL TOWERS
The Prudential Towers joint-venture represents the
first publicly acknowledged infusion of Japanese equity
capital into Chicago by a major Japanese life insurance
company. The deal is a joint-venture for a 50 percent
interest in both the existing One Prudential Plaza and the
recently begun Two Prudential Plaza. The equity infusion
from Nissei has been estimated to be $140 million.2 The
general partners in the joint-venture agreement are
Prudential Life Insurance Company and Nissei Realty. Nissei
is the U.S. subsidiary of Japan's largest insurance company,
Nippon Life. Prudential is the largest insurance company in
the world.3 "Nippon began evaluating the [U.S. real estate)
market in 1978 -- three years before the Ministry of Finance
permitted direct investment by Japanese life insurance
companies." 4
After less than six months from the initial
presentation to closing, the transaction closed just before
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years-end on December 29, 1986, according to James Purinton,
the General Manager of Prudential Development's Chicago
office. Prudential and Nissei had done business prior to
this venture when Prudential sold the Crocker Tower in San
Francisco to Nissei in late 1986.
The deal is structured as a general partnership with
Prudential acting as the developer (of Two Prudential Plaza)
and as the managing partner. A local firm has been retained
as the leasing agent for the buildings. Prudential is
authorized to make the day-to-day decisions regarding the
property although Nissei remains an active partner, who must
be consulted on any major decisions.
The 41-story One Prudential Center was built in the mid
1950's and is currently being renovated. It is
substantially leased and contains 1,100,000 square feet of
rentable area. The Leo Burnett Company, the building's
major tenant occupying 225,000 square feet, will vacate
their space when their lease expires in 1989 at which time
they will move into 500,000 square feet in their own
headquarters building currently under construction.
Two Prudential Plaza is expected to be completed in
April, 1989. The new 64-story tower will have approximately
930,000 square feet of leasable area. McGraw Hill has
already committed to a minimum of 75,000 square feet and a
major law firm has committed to 32,500 square feet.
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Purinton stated the project is timed so that combined
occupancy of both Prudential Plaza One and Two never falls
below 60 percent.
Purinton suggested the deal structure of this project is
not unusual compared to other deal structures they have
negotiated. With respect to foreign investor behavior, he
felt it was unusual for a foreign investor to participate in
a venture that was essentially one-half development.
Although no specifics were cited, Purinton emphasized the
deal was structured so as to mitigate the risks of this
development for the Japanese investor who he believes has a
tendancy to be risk averse. Purinton also commented that,
in comparison to other transactions involving Japanese
investors covered in the press, Nissei was able to make a
decision relatively quickly even though ultimate approval
came from Tokyo.
CASE STUDY 131 THE NIKKO HOTEL
October, 1987, is the anticipated completion date for
the 450 room Chicago Nikko Hotel. The hotel is a joint
venture between Tishman Realty and Construction and Japan
Airlines(JAL) with a participating mortgage provided by
Sumitomo Realty.
Tishman and JAL were introduced through a personal
network, according to a former employee of Tishman. A U.S.
architect, of Japanese ancestry, was aware that JAL wanted a
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site in Chicago for a hotel and approached Tishman in the
winter of 1985. JAL subsequently arranged for Sumitomo's
participation in the transaction. Sumitomo does not
normally finance hotel ventures. Their participation in
this transaction evolved from a close business relationship
between JAL and Sumitomo. One year after the negotiations
were begun, the deal was completed.
Nikko Hotels, JAL's U.S. development subsidiary, has
targeted several U.S. cities in which they plan to purchase
or develop hotels to establish a chain of hotels in the
United States which will complement their flights. JAL
intends to generate hotel business by offering travel
packages to tourists who both book flights on Japan Airlines
and reserve accomodations at a Nikko Hotel. JAL has been
increasing flights into Chicago's O'Hare airport and
therefore selected Chicago as one of six U.S. cities
targetted for hotel developments. The other cities are: New
York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., and
Atlanta. In New York, Nikko has purchased the Essex House
from Marriott, and in San Francisco, Nikko bought plans for
a hotel that was already designed. The Chicago Nikko
represents the first hotel in the planned chain that has
been designed and developed by JAL.
The project is estimated to cost $74 million of which
$68 million is being provided by Sumitomo in the form of
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participating debt. There is approximately $6 million in
equity in the project.
JAL considered several sites for the hotel in the
Chicago area. According to a former employee of Tishman who
was involved in the negotiations, JAL selected the site for
several reasons. The Japanese appeared to be enamored not
only with the proximity of the site to the center of town,
but also with its location on the Chicago River. This real
estate professional suggests that the importance of water in
the Japanese culture, as is evidenced by the presence and
importance of the river in Osaka where JAL is headquartered,
were important in the ultimate site selection.
The site was attractive because the deal could be put
together fairly rapidly due to a pre-existing relationship
between Tishman and the seller of the property. Tishman had
developed relationships with both JAL and with the Canadian
landowner enabling Tishman to negotiate an equitable deal on
behalf of the Japanese fairly rapidly.
Sources suggested some inconsistencies in the
development objectives of the two parties. The Japanese
were looking beyond this particular hotel, to the
establishment of their U.S. chain. Since this is the first
hotel they are developing, Nikko is hoping to make a
statement and to establish a presence in the United States.
Of ultimate importance to JAL is the long-term goals and
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viability of the chain, not necessarily of this one hotel.
On the other side, Tishman does not want to be in the
position of operating a hotel over the long run.
CASE STUDY #4l 101 NORTH WACKER DRIVE
In March, 1987, the Chicago Tribune reported a joint-
venture between Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and
Dai-Ichi Seimei America Corporation, Dai-Ichi Mutual Life
Insurance Company's U.S. subsidiary. Dai-Ichi is the
second largest insurance company in Japan and Metropolitan
Life is the second largest U.S. life company.5 The
transaction involved the sale of a 50 percent interest
through a general partnership arrangement in 101 North
Wacker Drive.
101 North Wacker Drive was built in 1980. The 24-story
building is headquarters to Hartmarx who occupies
approximately 185,000 square feet of the total 567,000
square feet. The building is currently 95 percent leased,
according to a source at Metropolitan Life.
101 North Wacker has changed ownership several times
according to Charles Palmer, president of the Palmer Group.
In 1983, Palmer, co-developer of 101 North Wacker, sold
their partial interest in the property to German investors,
The Lendhorf Group, who in turn sold their interest in the
building to Metropolitan Life in 1985. Prior to the sale of
the property to the German investors, Palmer reported he had
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spoken to Dai-Ichi regarding 101 North Wacker. At that time
Dai-Ichi was unwilling to take the equity risk and instead
was only willing to negotiate a debt and equity position.
According to Palmer, Dai-Ichi had the opportunity to obtain
higher returns through an equity participation.
The relationship between Metropolitan Life and Dai-Ichi
was established through Metropolitan's New York office with
little involvement from their Chicago office. The
partnership agreement establishes Metropolitan Life as the
managing partner. The property is leased and managed by a
local real estate firm.
A vice president at Metropolitan Life feels that the
only difference in dealing with a foreign investor was
Dai-Ichi took longer than would a domestic firm to complete
the due diligence process. Because all decisions had to
ultimately be made in Tokyo, he reported an unusually long
time frame in negotiating and completing the transaction.
PENDING TRANSACTIONS
The transactions that are pending in the Chicago area
are as diverse as those that have closed. All known pending
transactions involve Japanese investors. One of these
transactions involves a Japanese construction company and a
local developer. This joint-venture involves the
development of a 650,000 square foot office building in
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downtown Chicago. The Japanese construction company will
own a 60 percent interest in the project and the remaining
40 percent will be retained by the developer. Construction
is expected to begin as soon as the transaction is
finalized.
The Japanese construction company, in addition to
taking an equity position in the project, will act as the
construction consultant during the construction period for
which they will be paid a fee.
Another transaction currently being negotiated between
a domestic insurance company and a Japanese insurance
company is a joint-venture as well. The Japanese investor
intends to purchase a 50 percent interest in a newly
constructed office building, completed in late 1986 in the
heart of Chicago's financial district. Pending approval
from the Ministry of Finance, the Japanese institution will
pay $210 million for the 50 percent interest. $70 million
of the total is debt. Currently, the building is
approximately 50 percent leased.
This property was marketed directly to the Japanese
investor. The domestic life insurance company's marketing
strategy was to initially identify a comparable Japanese
institution and then to offer this Japanese investor an
exclusive right of first refusal to participate in the
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joint-venture. The domestic institution felt that this
approach would appeal to Japanese investors' sensitivity to
publicity and competition and would ultimately justify a
larger price.
To price the joint venture participation, cap rates and
per square foot sales prices of other acquisitions on the
east and west coasts were used. Those involved in the
transaction felt that "Chicago should be priced like other
cities." Chicago comparables were also not used because not
many buildings have sold recently in Chicago. Whereas this
price may be competitive with other cities, it is
substantially higher, on a per square foot basis, than other
recent sales in the Chiago market. The property is expected
to yield approximately nine percent.
The U.S. realty subsidiary of a Japanese life insurance
company has been negotiating for the past eight months with
a Chicago developer and a large U.S. corporation regarding a
major development project in downtown Chicago that will add
almost two million square feet of office space to the
Chicago office market in two phases of development. The
domestic developer originally intended to finance the
project with a credit master lease and by selling bonds
through a Japanese bank. Instead, the developer is issuing
bonds underwritten by a major investment bank and the
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Japanese bank is giving a letter of credit. This Japanese
bank approached the Japanese life insurance company who has
agreed to provide a convertible second mortgage on the
project.
The building is expected to be completed in 1989 and is
currently 70 percent leased. Upon completion, the building
is expected to lease for $36.00 per square foot.
A vice president of the U.S. subsidiary of the Japanese
insurance company involved in the transaction reported the
investment opportunity was presented to them prior to the
company identifying the Chicago market for investment.
Before agreeing to participate in the transaction, they
reviewed the Chicago market with which they were unfamiliar.
This is their second transaction in the United States, the
first being a limited partnership interest in 13 properties
with Trammell Crow. With the hopes of better understanding
U.S. markets and deal structures, this firm has recently
hired an American trained in real estate to analyze their
transactions. The vice president stated that while their
specific strategies regarding investment in the United
States are in the formulation stage, they hope to form a
"real American company," a company whose employees are
American versus Japanese. They feel that Americans are more
familiar with U.S. real estate markets and thus have
established information networks within these markets. This
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vice president feels that hiring Americans will give his
company a competitive advantage over other Japanese
companies who do not employ Americans. Although having
American employees, decisions will continue to be made in
Tokyo. Furthermore, with an experienced and domestic staff,
this may reduce their need for intermediaries.
As Exhibit 10 illustrates, the transactions indicate
the presence of Japanese, Dutch, Swiss, Middle Eastern, and
German equity investment in the Chicago real estate market.
In addition, these transactions illustrate the presence of
foreign life insurance companies, construction companies,
development companies, wealthy individuals, and pension
funds in the area. The deals range from joint ventures to
100 percent fee simple purchases and involve both debt and
equity.
From the cases described, some differences between
foreign and domestic investment behavior should be readily
apparent whereas other differences may be more subtle.
Since a variety of nationalities and investor types are
active in Chicago, it is difficult to generalize behavioral
differences between foreign and domestic investors.
However, Chapter Six discusses some of these general
behavioral differences between foreign and domestic
investors in Chicago.
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Chapter Six
ARE FOREIGN INVESTORS IN CHICAGO
DIFFERENT FROM DOMESTIC INVESTORS?
In addition to the obvious language differences,
domestic sources often assume foreign investors behave
differently than domestic investors. To determine if this
perception prevailed in Chicago, real estate professionals
involved in transactions with foreign investors were asked
to comment on differences in negotiating and dealing with
the foreign investors they were involved with. If these
sources had had prior involvement with foreign investors,
they were also asked to comment if and how these differences
have changed over time or if there were differences between
foreign investors of different nationalities. The
discussions focused on whether or not there were
differences, between foreign and domestic investors, in
investment motivations, deal structures, decision making,
strategies, management of properties, and pricing.
As mentioned previously, it is quite difficult to make
generalizations due to the wide scope and the diverse nature
of foreign investors and investment activity in Chicago. To
complicate matters further, just as there is no such thing
as a "typical" foreign investor, there is no such thing as a
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"typical" domestic investor with which to compare foreign
investors.
WHAT DRIVES FOREIGN INVESTMENT: MOTIVATIONS
What motivates foreign investors to acquire property in
the United States and in Chicago has previously been
described in both Chapter Two and in Chapter Four.
Some of the motivations that encourage foreign entities
to invest in the United States are the result of cultural
differences between different nationalities. There are
general incentives that motivate foreign investors which are
not applicable to domestic investors. For example, the
economic situations in foreign countries (such as trade
surpluses), the exchange rate disparities that make U.S.
real estate investments both affordable and profitable, as
well as the limited investment opportunities in other
countries all serve as incentives to foreign investors but
have essentially no bearing on domestic investment
decisions.
Foreign and domestic economic conditions, exchange rate
disparities, and attractive investment opportunities
motivate foreigners to invest their capital in the United
States but not specifically in any one region or city.
Based on information received regarding specific
transactions in Chicago, it appears that, with the exception
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of macro-economic factors, foreign investors are motivated
by many of the same things that induce domestic investment
in this city. Both foreign and domestic investors have
similar, yet not identical, goals and strategies. In
addition, both foreign and domestic investors are motivated
by favorable investment yields, diversification objectives,
relationships, and investment opportunities.
Foreign and domestic investors have similar, if not
identical, underlying investment goals. For example, the
objectives of any pension fund, foreign or domestic, are
essentially the same - asset and liability matching.
Pension funds, foreign or domestic, are charged with
assuring that their current assets will be able to cover
their liabilities in the future. Therefore, both foreign
and domestic pension funds are interested in safe
investments that are guaranteed to produce future cash flows
sufficient to cover these liabilities.
Both foreign and domestic investments are driven by
returns anticipated from real estate acquisitions. Yield
requirements, for any investor, vary according to the
perceived risk of an investment. What is an adequate yield
to one party, however, may not be acceptable to another.
For example, in Japan, where yields on downtown Tokyo
property average two percent, a six percent yield in the
United States is more appealing to a Japanese investor an
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alternate investment in Tokyo. A six percent yield seems
low to a domestic investor who is accustomed to eight to ten
percent yields. Therefore, in a qualitative sense, adequate
yields must be derived from investment. However,
quantitatively, what yields are acceptable depends to some
extent on the nationality and investor type. Lower yields,
by American standards, are often acceptable to foreign
investors because of the safe nature of the investments.
Existing relationships between foreign and domestic
parties also encourage foreign investment in the Chicago
area. Foreign concerns appear to be much more
relationship-oriented than their domestic counterparts.
Foreign investors often complain, in negotiating with
domestic parties, domestic firms are more concerned with
closing the transaction and moving on rather than building a
relationship. There is evidence that an investment will be
undertaken in Chicago on the basis of a prior relationship.
One transaction that has yet to be completed is based upon
an ongoing three-year relationship between a domestic
insurance company and a comparable Japanese institution.
Another transaction involving Wilma Realty (Case Study #1)
was initiated through its established relationship with a
U.S. developer. The real estate industry functions on
personal networks and it is no different when foreign
investors are involved.
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Foreign and domestic investors are motivated to invest
in Chicago properties as a portfolio diversification
strategy to geographically balance their portfolio of U.S.
real estate. Since there was only one foreign investor
identified who owned more than one property, there is no
evidence of product diversification in the Chicago market by
foreigners. The two properties owned by a Dutch pension
fund in the Chicago metropolitan area are both 200,000
square foot suburban office buildings. Domestic players in
Chicago are more inclined to invest in Chicago for
geographical diversification, and within the market for
product diversification as well. At this time, foreign
investors seem to concentrate more on geographic
diversification within the United States as opposed to
product diversification within any one market.
What motivates both foreign and domestic investors is a
combination of factors. It appears that investment
motivation is both property-specific and investor-specific.
For example, location, joint-venture partner, yields, and
attributes of the physical property are all important
factors that are analyzed by both foreign and domestic
investors. In a May article in Real Estate Forum, Naohiko
Mogami, a Japanese native and a vice president at Bank of
America's investment real estate operation in San Francisco
explains that "they (the Japanese] may have slightly
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different priorities than their American counterparts, but
it should not be forgotten that they are driven by the same
investment motivation as U.S. investors: getting the most
economic benefits possible within their investment
criteria." (emphasis added)1
Similar motivations for investment contribute to
competition between foreign and domestic investors for the
same property. However, this competition seems to be
restricted to downtown prestige properties in major cities
and is not prevalent to the same extent in the suburbs or
with other property types.
DEAL STRUCTURE
In examining recent transactions in Chicago, there
appear to be differences in how a foreign investor
approaches structuring a deal than how a domestic firm would
approach the same transaction. Foreign investors approach
and structure deals with domestic firms and institutions
differently than if both parties in the transaction were
domestic. Foreign investors often attach different levels
of importance to different return measures in property
valuation, use a longer time horizon in investment analysis,
take different risk postures, and structure simpler
transactions.
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Sources commented on the importance/non-importance of
different return measures for different investors. For
example, many domestic firms tend to give more weight to the
internal rate of return. Whereas foreign firms may compute
this return measure, they seem to value the cash on cash
return more.
Foreign investors evaluate investment property over a
longer time horizon than do domestic investors. Most of the
foreign investors in the Chicago market extended their
property analysis to include income and expense projections
for anywhere from 20 to 40 years into the future. Different
nationalities also seem to have different time horizons.
Some Japanese investors operate on a 25-year time horizon
and one source reported that an English investor operated on
a 40-year time horizon. Because of this difference,
projections and pro formas were carried out for a longer
time period, and the long term appreciation potential of the
property was often deemed more important to the foreign
investors than the short term cash flow. Short term cash
flow may increase in importance to foreign investors if they
heed the recommendations of their advisors in the U.S.
Foreign investors are typically stereotyped as being
risk averse. In the Chicago market risk aversion is more a
function of investor type than the result of being
"foreign." There were transactions in which the domestic
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parties reported structuring the deals so as to mitigate the
risk to the foreign party through master leases,
pre-leasing, and guaranteed preferred returns. Just as
often there were entrepreneurial firms involved in Chicago
real estate ventures that were willing to take both leasing
and development risks for a larger return than they would
normally expect from "risk-free" investments. Risk aversion
appears to be directly related to the length of time and the
familiarity with the Chicago market, as well as the length
of time that the foreign investor has been active in U.S.
real estate.
What seemed to surprise some domestic parties in
transactions involving foreign purchases of Chicago
properties was the frequency of all-cash purchases. They
did not feel this would occur in transactions involving only
domestic firms. However, this may be somewhat misleading
because it is difficult to track capital flows and therefore
it cannot be determined if these properties were financed
subsequent to their purchase.
A majority of those interviewed feel a transaction
involving a foreign party is similar to what would result
from the negotiations of two domestic firms. Each party in
a transaction has a different risk posture and brings a
different set of variables to the table that enable
trade-offs to be made.
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Often the deal structure is similar to that of a
domestic structure because of the domestic intermediary
involved on behalf of the foreign client who is ultimately
charged with structuring the transaction. These
intermediaries are familiar with domestic deal structures
and U.S. legal requirements as well as with their foreign
client's investment requirements. Since these investment
objectives are often determined with the help of a domestic
advisor, what ultimately results is a deal that looks very
similar to a transaction involving two domestic parties.
As is the case with domestic transactions, the ultimate
deal structure results from who brings what to the table and
what there is to divide. Each party enters negotiations
with certain goals and objectives, and one would expect if
foreign investors ultimately have goals and objectives
similar to domestic investors, deal structures would be
similar as well.
DECISION MAKING
Depending again on the nationality and the type of
foreign investor, there are differences in how decisions are
made. Differences in decision making specifically relate to
the amount of time involved to negotiate and close a deal.
In Chicago, some domestic parties involved in negotiations
with foreign entities reported it took longer to negotiate
with these foreign parties whereas others noticed no
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differences in the amount of time it took to close the
transaction. One source stated that it took his firm longer
to negotiate with a domestic institution because of the U.S.
legal requirements with which to comply. With domestic
approval a prerequisite for investment, it is not surprising
that decision making sometimes takes longer when a foreign
party is involved. However, this does not always hold. For
example, several of the transactions in Chicago were closed
in six months or less which is not unusual, from a domestic
perspective.
Of all the foreign investors, the Japanese investors
are most often accused of requiring an extensive length of
time for analysis and negotiation of investments. Arthur
Mitchell, a partner at the New York law firm Coudert
Brothers, stated in a speech "In the past, Ministry approval
has taken from three to six months; many recent transactions
have been approved within 30 to 45 days. Many insurance
company executives believe that as more and more
transactions are done, the entire process will be
accelerated further."2 In another speech, Mitchell commented
that "Some of the lack of speed can be attributed to
unfamiliarity with the market in general or certain market
practices in connection with the negotiation and
documentation of real estate transactions." 3 Mitchell
continued:
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Another factor highlighted by many commentators
is the so-called ringi system under which all
relevant executives both in the United States and
Japan are consulted concerning the decision to
purchase a particular property. It has been
reported that this process may take between 30 to
60 days and can involve up to 10 separate stages.
Also, the speed with which a company can make a
decision will depend in great deal upon the stage
that it has reavhed in its real estate
acquisition program.
Domestic real estate professionals cannot rely on the
assumption that Japanese investors require more time to make
decisions. A more valid assumption for domestic
professionals is that the ultimate decisions and approval
will be made in Japan. With more experience in U.S. real
estate, increased confidence in U.S. markets, and
established relationships, Japanese investors are capable of
making quick decisions. In the Prudential-Nissei
joint-venture (Case Study #2), the parties were able to
negotiate and close the transaction in six months after
Prudential's initial presentation to Nissei, according to
James Purinton of Prudential. Also, one source stated that
because of the number of transactions certain Japanese firms
have completed in the United States, the Ministry or
Finance, is beginning to process these firms' requests more
quickly since a previous relationship has been established
between the MOF and those firms that are active investors in
U.S. properties. Furthermore, some sources speculate that
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Japanese investors are learning in order to take advantage
of opportunities and to compete with domestic investors,
they must make investment decisions quickly.
In addition to nationality, decision making is often a
function of the investor type as well. Certain types of
investors are required to have domestic approval whereas
others, such as wealthy individuals, are not. Several
professionals suggested decision making is likely to be
expedited if all of the information can be assembled in a
timely fashion. This, in combination with pre-established
relationships, is likely to produce quicker decisions.
STRATEGIES
Many of those interviewed believe foreign investment
strategies are a function of the investors' knowledge and
understanding of U.S. real estate markets. This knowledge
and understanding in turn is linked to the length of time
that the foreign investor has been active in the U-.S. real
estate market.
Differences in investment strategies between foreign
and domestic investors are most apparent with respect to
locational preferences, product preferences, and the
aggressiveness of the investment strategy.
One strategy that differentiates foreign investors from
domestic investors is their geographical and locational
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preferences for investment. Most foreign investors
demonstrate a preference for major metropolitan cities such
as New York and Los Angeles. According to several
investment advisors, in addition to favoring large cities,
foreign investors, depending on the length of time they have
been active in the United States, are often unwilling to
pursue suburban properties. Out of the 26 transactions
identified in this study, seven represent suburban
investment, three of which are regional malls. Foreign
investors may not pursue suburban properties because prices
of suburban properties are often lower than their minimum
investment amount. For example, according to one
intermediary, Sumitomo will not invest less than $100
million in any one transaction. There are few suburban
properties in Chicago that can satisfy this investment
criteria. This difference seems to become significantly
less pronounced with the length of time an investor has been
investin
Chicago
and a
g in U.S. real estate. Suburban properties in
are owned by Dutch investors, an English investor,
Middle Eastern investor. One German investor
purchased a suburban shopping mall in Chicago but sold it to
a domestic firm just three months after the acquisition.
Property type preferences can be another distinguishing
factor between foreign and domestic investors. According to
a source at Jones Lang Wooten, the Japanese in particular
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are not interested in "pre-war" buildings because most
Japanese investors think that new buildings have the longest
lasting value. Sources report, in Chicago foreign investors
are reluctant to invest in buildings completed before 1980.
In other cities, buildings completed since 1970 are suitable
for investment. Of primary interest are well-located,
downtown, substantially leased office buildings. Foreign
investors are also inclined to invest in hotel developments.
Two such hotel developments are currently under construction
in Chicago by both Swiss and Japanese interests. Domestic
investors often prefer not to invest in hotel properties.
Foreign investors do not seem to be as aggressive as
domestic investors with respect to the amount of risk that
they are willing to take. Foreign investors have
traditionally focused on well located, prestige office
buildings in major cities. They often spend a long time and
are extremely cautious analyzing investment opportunities
and often will not take leasing risks. Foreign investment
and operating strategies extend over a longer time horizon
than do many domestic investors. Foreign investors tend to
be painstakingly careful and diligent in their analysis and
rely more heavily on assumptions made in their evaluations.
In a report on Japanese investment in U.S. real estate
conducted at MIT's Center for Real Estate Development,
Nippon Life's investment strategies for U.S. real estate
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acquisitions are identified.
that this is a typical investment strategy that holds for
most Japanese life insurance companies:
Nippon Life seeks long-term, stable real estate
investment in the United States that is compatible
with the nature of funds available to life
insurance companies. It avoids speculative
investments such as those that promise short-term
capital gain. An insurance company like Nippon
Life has to make sure that every effort to minimize
the investment risks that accompany high-return
ventures is taken. This investment policy means
that the company has focused on existing prime
buildings in financial districts in major
cities...It is reluctant to invest in growing
cities, suburban areas and development projects
because it believes that such investments are
speculative and5vulnerable to changes in the state
of the economy.
VIB N.V., a Dutch real estate investment trust, with
one third of its total portfolio in U.S. real estate
investments, identifies its strategy in its 1986 annual
report:
VIB's investment strategy is clear: spread of
risks, project management under its own control and
ownership of large projects through joint-ventures.
A small part of the portfolio is invested in
development projects... The investment strategy is
directed towards the goal of ensuring shareholders
attractive dividends and growth in value of their
shares. Another goal is to limit risk through the
spreading of the portfolio, geographically as well
as regarding kind of projects....Development
projects will only be considered if the inherent
risks can, as much as possible, be left with
partners or companies which are specialized in this
area...Efforts to invest in office projects are
primarily concentrated on cities like Boston,
Chicago and Washington D.C. Also the area to the
south of Los Angeles 6and the city of San Francisco
have VIB's interest.
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The authors feel confident
Like domestic investment strategies, the strategies of
foreign investors are constantly reviewed and changed. Many
of the new Japanese investors are still in the process of
formulating strategies for U.S. real estate investment.
Investment strategies also differ relative to nationality
and investor type.
Many of the Japanese strategies involve the
formalization of relationships. They appear to be much more
relationship oriented than do domestic investors, who they
often regard as more transaction oriented.
MANAGEMENT OF PROPERTIES
Many foreign property owners in Chicago hire local
firms to manage and to lease their property. This is
similar to a domestic investor entering a new market with
which the investor is not familiar. In this kind of
situation it is not economically feasible to hire a staff to
monitor the property. Management difficulties arise from
the distance a foreign investor must travel to directly
monitor property operations as it would with a non-local,
yet domestic, property owner with the exception of the
greater travel distance involved. This perhaps is becoming
decreasingly important with the presence of U.S.
subsidiaries. Some of these U.S. subsidiaries are managing
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properties for their own account, however this has yet to
happen in the Chicago area. Generally, however, with
foreign investors in the Chicago area owning only one
property, they rely on either a joint venture partner or
will hire a local firm to direct management
and leasing efforts.
Foreign property owners also often retain advisors as
asset managers. This added dimension to the management of
property gives the foreign entity additional security and
comfort. Most foreign property owners visit their
acquisitions several times a year. Many of those
interviewed felt that foreign property owners were quite
meticulous regarding the management of their U.S.
properties. This is most likely caused by the long time
horizon often involved in foreign ownership and their
reliance on long term property appreciation. The Japanese
are particularly involved in property management.
PRICING
Partially due to the inability to obtain sales data, it
was difficult to find corroborating evidence in the Chicago
market that foreign investors had paid more than a domestic
firm would in the same situation, which is a prevalent
notion and a misleading expectation concerning foreign
investors. Japanese investors, in particular, are willing
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to pay a premium for a prestige and low-risk property. Most
people involved in transactions in Chicago reported the
prices paid by foreign investors were fair market prices,
often negotiated by a domestic advisor on behalf of the
foreign entity.
In two Chicago transactions in which sales prices were
disclosed, foreign investors appeared to have paid more for
these properties than a domestic investor would have paid.
In one transaction (expected to close in September, 1987)
between a domestic real estate company and a private
Japanese investor for a downtown office building, sources
report the Japanese investor used a lower than market rate
cap rate to determine the offer price. A representative for
the seller reported although cap rates of nine percent are
typical in Chicago, this investor imputed the value of the
property using a cap rate of eight percent. In another
transaction, which is expected to close around the same time
between a domestic life insurance company and a Japanese
insurance company, the sales price was based on comparables
in other markets such as Los Angeles and New York City. As
a result, the sales price of over $250 per square foot is
substantially higher than Jones Lang Wooten Investment
Research estimates of recent sales prices of between $100
and $150 per square foot in the Chicago office market.7
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Whether or not foreign investors in fact pay more is
difficult to ascertain and most of the information is
speculative since many of the actual sales prices are
confidential. Also, because of confidentiality, it is
difficult to determine sales prices paid by domestic
investors for comparison. Therefore, it is not possible to
compare sales prices with any accuracy to determine if there
are in fact real differences. According to those
interviewed, it seems that the Japanese are becoming
increasingly sensitive about the transactions they are
negotiating because of the recent press coverage which
portrays Japanese investors as reckless buyers. The
Japanese are most diligent and cautious in their analysis of
potential deals and the prices they are paying, they feel,
are being misinterpreted as being careless rather than just
a premium for quality, long term appreciation and risk
mitigation.
WHAT CAUSES DIFFERENCES?
Different cultures, differences in how business is
conducted as well as distance cause differences between
foreign and domestic investors. One real estate
professional in Chicago commented that the ways of doing
business in Europe are different than in the United States.
These differences tend to cause differences in opinion
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between domestic and foreign entities engaged in business
transactions. Business practices in Japan are also
different.
Are foreign investors different from domestic
investors? Yes and no. Some foreigners appear to be more
"different" than others. Those appearing most different are
those investors having the least amount of experience in the
market.
Thus it appears that foreign investors in Chicago
differ slightly from domestic investors in a qualitative
sense. That is, they are motivated by many of the same
factors that appeal to domestic investors. However, there
are demonstrated quantitative differences manifested in
different yields, holding periods, the time required for
decision making and perhaps in prices.
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Chapter Seven
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHICAGO: OUTLOOK AND OPPORTUNITIES
THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHICAGO: TRENDS AND
PROJECTIONS
According to local and national real estate
professionals, the future of foreign investment in the
United States depends on a number of factors, including the
strength of the dollar relative to other currencies and the
economies of other countries. Clearly, the future of
foreign investment in Chicago is directly tied to that of
the United States. Those interviewed feel foreign
investment activity in Chicago has the potential to
increase. This is based on the assumptions that market
vacancy rates will decline, that absorption of space will
increase, and that investment opportunities, corresponding
to the known preferences of foreign entities, will be
available. Many seem to think as opportunities on the
coasts become expensive and limited, foreign investors will
be prompted to look more closely for investments in the
Chicago market.
There is already some evidence of increased foreign
investment activity in the Chicago market, caused by the
presence of Japanese investors. In 1986, the Japanese had
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publicly committed to only a 450-room hotel and a $50
million mortgage. Since the beginning of 1987, two
additional joint- venture projects (The Prudential Plazas
and 101 North Wacker) representing 2.6 million square feet
of space in downtown Chicago and involving Japanese equity
participation have been announced. By year's end 1987, the
Japanese may double their 1986 investments in Chicago by
purchasing in excess of five million square feet of space in
seven projects in Chicago if the transactions that are
currently being negotiated close.
Those interviewed feel several factors contribute to
increased foreign investment in Chicago such as its size,
its broad and diverse economy, and the presence of
international firms. Additionally, portfolio
diversification objectives and proximity to industry may
prompt foreign investors to pursue investments in the
Chicago market. Many feel that Chicago may become a first
choice as a target city for real estate investment for
foreign investors. As those in the industry refer to it,
Chicago may become a "first tier city." According to
international advisors, preliminary evidence of Chicago's
increasing popularity among foreign investors is illustrated
by Japanese and European investors who have added Chicago to
this target list and are actively seeking property in the
area.
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For foreign investment in Chicago to continue at its
current level and to increase, several things need to occur
within the market: the market must begin to show some signs
of recovery, foreign confidence in the city must increase,
and there must be investment opportunities made available to
foreign investors. Additionally, factors exogenous to the
market such as limited opportunities and saturation of other
U.S. real estate markets could further add to increased
foreign investment in Chicago.
Real estate professionals who have done business with
foreign investors report.foreign investors are very diligent
in trying to learn and understand market behavior and
trends. Furthermore, real estate is an industry dependent
on the flow of good information. If the current trend of
limited information on transactions continues, it may take
foreign investors more time than in other cities, such as
Los Angeles or Washington D.C., to develop this
understanding of the market and to feel comfortable pursuing
investments in the city.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REAL ESTATE PROFESSIONALS
Because of the demonstrated foreign investment interest
in Chicago and because of the differences in the way that
foreign investors behave, there are opportunities for
domestic real estate professionals, such as property owners,
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brokers, lawyers, managing and leasing agents, and
developers, to tap foreign sources of capital. Domestic
real estate professionals may have opportunities to generate
fee income, to arrange favorable debt or equity project
financing, to participate in joint venture arrangements with
foreign entities, to sell properties, or to act as an
intermediary between domestic sellers and foreign buyers.
Real Estate management and leasing firms have
opportunities to generate fee income from foreign sources by
managing and leasing foreign-owned properties. Most, if not
all, of the foreign-owned properties in Chicago are managed
and leased by local agents. Since the foreign property
owners in Chicago do not have offices in Chicago nor the
degree of expertise in the market, they thus form ongoing
relationships with local experts to manage and lease their
properties.
Foreign entities have demonstrated a willingness to
finance properties in the Chicago area with both debt and
equity or some combination thereof. Real estate
professionals seeking to refinance existing properties or to
finance new developments may find foreign investors a ready
source of capital. The cost to the domestic party seeking
to obtain this low cost financing often includes agreeing to
master lease the property, fulfill pre-leasing requirements,
and guarantee preferred returns. These arrangements
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mitigate the risk to the foreign investor. Sometimes, it
may take longer to negotiate the transaction, which is one
more factor to be considered by domestic parties hoping to
structure transactions with foreign entities.
Several Chicago firms have successfully marketed and
sold total or partial interests in property to foreign
investors. In some cases, the foreign investor paid a
premium, by Chicago standards, for the property. If foreign
investors continue to add Chicago to their list of target
cities for investment, there is an opportunity for local
sellers of properties to possibly receive higher prices for
their properties than if they were sold to domestic firms.
This is dependent on the properties themselves and the
competition in the market.
Brokers who have a thorough knowledge of the Chicago
market have the opportunity to align themselves with both
foreign investors who are looking for property and with
sellers who are seeking to dispose of property. Foreign
investors have a need for complete market information. They
will often spend a long time investigating the market prior
to acquiring property. Brokers are in the position to
expedite market data collection and to make foreign
investors aware of investment opportunities in the market.
The best way for domestic real estate professionals to
tap these vast capital resources is to establish
111
relationships with a foreign investor either directly or
through a local or national intermediary. It was already
mentioned that direct relationships can sometimes be
difficult to establish. Often, intermediaries outside of
the city act to bring foreign investors together with
domestic real estate developers, brokers, and leasing and
managing agents. It appears that having contacts with
investment bankers and international investment advisors in
New York City, and possibly with their branches in Chicago,
often precedes foreign investment in Chicago. Therefore, it
would seem logical for Chicago real estate professionals to
develop networks with those professionals in New York City
until direct relationships can be established with foreign
investors or foreign investors begin to more actively pursue
Chicago investment opportunities.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Significant differences exist among foreign investors
by both country and by investor type. In Chicago, different
nationalities of investors prefer different types of
properties, have different levels of experience in the
Chicago market, and have different risk postures. These
preferences also vary by the type of investor. Whereas
a Japanese airlines is willing to undertake the development
of a hotel, a Japanese insurance company is only willing,
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thus far, to enter into a joint venture arrangement with a
large domestic institution.
The longer a particular foreign investor is active in
U.S. real estate, the more they behave like domestic
investors. The Canadians, who have been investing in
Chicago for some time are almost indistinguishable from
domestic investors. However, the Japanese, who are
relatively new to the Chicago real estate market are more
apt to behave differently than would a domestic investor
with respect to decision making, deal structure, risk
posture, and product preference.
Foreign investors of all types exhibit a very strong
downtown preference. At this time, most foreign investors
in the Chicago market exhibit a strong downtown preference
with the exception of regional suburban shopping malls.
Those interviewed feel that downtowns are apt to recover
faster following soft market conditions than would the
suburbs. Cultural familiarity with suburban markets is not
as great in foreign countries as it is in the United States,
and because foreign investors tend to go to places they
know, major downtowns are most often familiar to foreign
investors and to those who must ultimately approve the
transactions at home. Of the 26 transactions identified, 19
(73 percent) are prestige downtown office properties.
Some foreign concerns are willing to pay a higher price
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for some types of U.S. real estate. Not all types of real
estate are able to command high prices from foreign
investors. The Japanese have demonstrated that in Chicago
they will use a lower cap rate than would a domestic
investor, for a downtown office property. This same
investor is not inclined to invest in the suburbs and
therefore would pay less than the market clearing price.
More than likely, a domestic investor or another foreign
investor who is comfortable with the suburbs, would outbid
the Japanese investor for a suburban property. What foreign
investors are willing to pay more for are those properties
that they see value in over the long run. Those properties
right now are mostly prestige, downtown office buildings
that have been built since 1980, and are substantially
leased to credit tenants.
Foreign investors tend to have a longer term view. The
longer time horizon is evident both in the analysis and the
projected holding period. Reasons why foreign investors
tend to operate on a longer time horizon are culturally
derived and stem also from their goal to preserve capital.
Longer holding periods in foreign countries are common.
Furthermore, since the United States is perceived to be a
safe haven for capital, foreign investors are interested in
investment in the U.S. to preserve this capital.
Foreign investors tend to be more relationship oriented
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than their
to dealing
reference
U.S. counterparts. Foreign investors are used
directly in transactions, and thus do not have a
point in their home countries for all of the
intermediaries typically involved in U.S. real estate
transactions. The Japanese in particular are unfamiliar
with the use of lawyers and with the volume of legal
documentation necessary in transactions with domestic
parties. In the United States it is often difficult for
them to feel comfortable with and to understand the
multitude of intermediaries and paperwork involved in
transactions. Foreign investors indicate a preference to
form on-going relationships with domestic parties. Domestic
investors seem to prioritize completing the transaction
rather than forming an on-going relationship.
Foreign investors tend to structure much simpler deals,
by American standards, on their purchases. Frequently
transactions that involve foreign purchasers are more
straightforward than transactions involving domestic
parties. Often the purchases are all cash as well.
Chicago is not currently a first choice for foreign
investors and most who have invested in this market own
property elsewhere in the United States. Foreign investors
have demonstrated their preference for investments in
coastal cities over investments in Chicago. Foreign equity
investment is present in 51 percent of the properties in the
115
Los Angeles CBD, and 12 percent of the Washington
D.C. market.1,2 In Chicago, foreign investment represents
less than 10 percent of the total inventory of space in the
Chicago metropolitan area.
Foreign investors are willing and likely to invest in
Chicago properties. As saturation of other markets
continues, prices for properties in these markets increase,
and Chicago becomes more familiar to foreign investors,
foreign investment activity in this market should increase.
Foreign investors have indicated that Chicago is an
appealing investment environment because of its size, its
economy, its growing international presence and its location
and, some of these investors have already added Chicago to
their list of target cities for U.S. investment.
The Japanese are beginning to feel more comfortable
with Chicago and should increase their purchases in this
market. If Japanese trade surpluses continue to be
substantial and exchange rates remain favorable, the
Japanese will increasingly look to Chicago for investment
opportunities to diversify their portfolios of U.S. real
estate. This trend has already begun as is evidenced by the
number of recent Japanese transactions in the market.
Japanese investors, including a construction company, a life
insurance company, and a private real estate company, are
expected to double their purchase of Chicago real estate in
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1987. Intermediaries suggest that the Japanese are studying
the market closely now and when they feel more comfortable,
they will increase their investments.
There are opportunities for Chicago real estate
professionals desiring to tap foreign sources of capital in
this market. Real estate professionals can position
themselves to take advantage of the differences that exist
between foreign and domestic real estate investors.
opportunities exist to generate fee income from both
management and leasing of foreign owned property, to arrange
debt and equity financing for existing product and new
construction, to provide valuable market information to new
entrants into the market, and to arrange and negotiate
transactions between foreign investors and domestic real
estate professionals.
Due to the limited time frame during which this study
was conducted, it by no means offers conclusive trends
regarding foreign investment in Chicago. It would probably
be useful for further research to be conducted regarding
each nationality separately rather than grouping foreign
investors together.
This study gives several examples suggesting that the
behavioral differences between different nationalities are
most likely greater than the differences between foreign,
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taken as a whole, and domestic. The biggest explanatory
variable for the differences that exist among foreign
investors is the length of time they have been in the United
States.
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Exhibit 1
Portfolio Investment by Nationality of Investor, 1985
Region or
Country
Western
Europe
Canada
Japan
Portfolio
Position
1984
250,525
24,771
50,304
Portfolio
Position
1985
311,462
25,328
80,789
Change in
Portfolio
Position
1984-1985
60,937
557
30,485
Percent of
Total Change
1984-1985
51.8
0.5
25.9
Latin American
Republics &
Other Western
Hemisphere
Other
Total
165,657
142,119
633,384
184,516
148,822
750,917
18,859
6,703
117,533
16.1
5.7
100.0
Source: "The International Investment Position of the United
States in 1985", by Russell B. Scholl, Survey of Current
Business, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, June 1986, p. 27.
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Exhibit 2
Foreign Direct Investment by Nationality of Investor, 1985
Region or
Country
Western
Europe
Canada
Japan
FDI
Position
1984
108,211
15,286
16,044
FDI
Position
1985
Change in
FDI
Position
1984-1985
120,906
16,678
19,116
12,695
1,392
3,072
Percent of
Total Change
1984-1985
69.1
7.6
16.7
Latin American
Republics &
Other Western
Hemisphere
Other
Total
16,201
8,841
164,583
17,050
9,201
182,951
849
360
18,368
4.6
2.0
100.0
Source: "Foreign Direct Investment in the United States and U.S.
Direct Investment Abroad Grew Moderately in 1985", News Release,
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, June
25, 1986, p.6.
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EXHIBIT 3
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN REAL ESTATE IN THE UNITED STATES
1980-1985
(Dollars in Millions)
1980
All Countries 6,120
Canada
1981 1982 1983 1984
8,889 11,397 13,946 17,761 18,557
1,158 1,770 1,882 2,106 2,844 2,580
Europe
European Communites(10)
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
United Kingdom
Dennaark, Greece, Ireland
Other Europe
Sweden
Switz.erland
Other
Japan
Austrailia, New Zealand,and
South Africa
Latin America
South and Central America
Panama
Other
Other Western Henisphere
Bermuda
Netherlands Antilles
U.K. Islands, Caribbean
Other
Middle East
Israel
Other
Other Africa, Asia, and Pacific
2,254
2,119
4
24
493
4
23
999
569
2
135
0
80
5 0
3,675
3,450
9
24
651
4
28
1,507
1,220
7
0
150
75
5,035
4,651
11
24
780
5
29
1,742I tx
2,051
11
384
0
300
84
6,638
6,224
10
28
815
25
2,189
3,140
12
414
0
324
90
8,255
7,714
10
66
966
0
0
2,471
4,135
42
0
148
8,821
8,238
9
26
1,049
(b)
24
4,623
(h)
583
0
444
139
264 302 394 457 744 1,054
56 55 60 61 120 117
1,979
233
171
62
1,746
61
437
228
20
(b)
(c)
(b)
2,566
268
185
83
2,298
111
1,880
265
43
362
0
362
3,273
,13
216
98
1,959
119
2,547
238
55 .
0
542
3,816
379
275
103
3,437
108
2,973
83
592
0
597
4,664
372
256
116
4,292
151
3,715
369
51'
709
0
709
1,808
307
139
108
4,507
110
3,945
399
47
746
1
745
(b) 160 212 271 423 430
Memorandun - OPEC 300 373 551 610 707 737
b - suppressed to avoid disclosure of
c - Less than $500,000
data to individual companies.
Source: Survey of Current Business, Oct. 1984, at 37-38, June
at 32. Aug. 1985, at 52; U.S. Department of Commerce,
Neos, June 25, 1986, at 6, quoted by R. Peter DeWitt
in Rel Estaie Review. Winter 1987, vol. 16, no. 4.
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Exhibit 4
Annual Japanese Real Estate Investment in the United States
YEAR INVESTMENT ($)
1980 $264 million
1981 $302 million
1982 $394 million
1983 $457 million
1984 $744 million
1985 $1.2 billion
*1986 $2.5 to $3.0 billion
*1987 $5.0 to $6.0 billion
* - Estimates, Real Estate Research Corporation,
"Japanese Investment in U.S. Real Estate,
Emerging Trends in Real Estate: 1987
(Equitable Real Estate Group, Inc., November
1987).
Source: Survey of Current Business quoted by R. Peter
DeWitt in "Foreign Direct Investment in U.S.
Real Estate," Real Estate Review, 16, (Winter
1987).
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Exhibit 5
Percentage of Foreign Holdings
of U.S. Propertaes
Netherlands
28.7%1 'A
Germany
14.2%
Japan
7.61%,
. 1980
Total Investment $3.5 billion
Netherlands
16.9% England
Japan
28.8%
1986
Total
Germany
10.2%
Canada
16.9%
Investment $14.8 billion
-'preliminary estimate
%ource: U.S. Department of Commerce
John E. Tsui, "Japan:
Development Magazine,
The Land Rush,"
(June 1987).
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Source:
Exhibit 6
DOWNTOWN VACANCY
1976-1986
17-
16-
IS
14-
13-
12-
11
10-
7-
4
3-
1978 1979
Source:
1980 1981 1982 1963 1984 1985 1986
0 CWcAGG -+ WTONAL
Jones Lang Wooten Investment Research, The
Downtown Office Market Report, (Novembe'~1T986).
125
-I
Exhibit 7
Chicago Office Market Performance and Rental Growth
Year-End
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988-89
New Construction
Inventory* and Renovations* Absorption* Vacancy (%)
85.8
89.5
94.4
98.3
103.5
3.7
3.7
4.9
3.9
5.2
3.3
3.2
1.8
1.8
3.6
10.4
10.6
13.3
14.9
15.7
Source: Jones Lang Wooten Investment Research, The Downtown
Chicago Office Market Report, (November 1986).
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Exhibit 8
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. REGIONS: 1985
Amount
(In Millic
$ 110Midwest
Northeast
Southeast
Southwest
West
Total Known Investment
Dollar Value Trans
Percent
ns) Of Total Number
.7 3 7
381.2
978.9
1,761.8
362.9
$3,595.5
11
27
49
100
28
33
44
20
132
actions
Percent
Of Total
5
21
26
33
15
100
Source: Jones Lang Wooten; and International Trade Administration,
"Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate," Urban Land, (April
1987), 33.
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Regional Origin of
Exhibit . 9
Foreign Real Estate Investment in Major U.S. Cities, 1979-1983
(Millions of Dollars)
Canada
Amount Percent
Europe
Amount Percent
Far East South America
Amount Percent Amount Percent
Middle East and
North Africa
Amount Percent
Other
Countries Total
Amount Percent Amount Percent
$8.024.3 ' 100% $3,716.4 100% $502.2
1,355.0 18 1,322.3 35 190.3
1,482.2 19 262.0 7 0
521.4 6 835.8 23 8.9
1,001.0 12 327.0 9 36.0
1,046.2 13 106.6 3 174.5
632.1 8 76.9 2 0
672.5 8 457.2 12 0
497.0 4 70.0 2 75.5
339.0 4 258.6 7 0
477.9 6 0 0 17.0
100%
38
0
2
7
35
0
0
15
0
3
$681.9
219.8
7.5
67.9
0
0
369.0
3.0
1.8
0
12.9
100%
32
1
10
0
0
55
0
2
$87.2
62.6
0
0
0
0
1.6
0
0
23.0
0
100%
72
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
26
0
$208.9
123.8
20
80
0
0
75.1
0
0
0
0
100%
59
1
4
0
0
36
0
0
0
0
'Less than 1%
Sources: Jones Lang Wootton and the International Trade Administration
Source: Joseph J. DelCasino, "European Investment in U.S. Office Markets,"
The Appraisal Journal, (January 1986).
Total
New York
Dallas
Houston
San Francisco
Los Angeles
Miami
Denver
San Diego
Boston
Seattle
$13,220.9
3,2738
1,753.7
1,442.0
1,364.0
1,327.3
1,154.7
1,132.7
644.3
6206
507.8
00
100%
24
13
11
10
10
9
9
5
5
4
Exhibit 10
Foreign Investment in Chicago
SOURCE
DATE COUNTRY
1986 JAPAN
PROPERTY
DOMESTIC
PARTNER/
SELLER INVESTOR
PRUDENTIAL PRUDENTIAL NISSEI REALTY E-JV
PLAZA
PHASE I
PHASE II (D*1989)
FORM SO. FT. PROP. TYPE PRICE
OFFICE $140,000,000
(E*)
1,100,000
930,000
1987 JAPAN 101 N. WACKER MET LIFE DAI-ICHI E-JV 570,000 OFFICE ?
1985 SWITZERLAND HOTEL SWISS SWISS AIR E 647 ROOMS HOTEL $125,000,000
BRAND (D) ? NESTLE (P)
EF HUTTON 18,000 RETAIL
1987* JAPAN AT&T CORP. STEIN & CO. JAPANESE LIFE CO D-E 1,900,000 OFFICE $360,000,000
CENTER (D*1989) (developer) JAPANESE BANK LC (P)
1987* JAPAN (PENDING) U.S. DEVELOPER JAPANESE E 350,000 + OFFICE $47,500,000
ENTREPRENEUR
? ENGLAND 33 N DEARBORN U.K. PENSION ? ? OFFICE
FUND
1985 JAPAN NIKKO HOTEL TISHMAN JAAN AIR LINES E-D 450 ROOMS HOTEL $74,000,000
(D*1987) REALTY & SUMITOMO
CONSTRUCTION
1986 NETHERLANDS 55 W WACKER COMBINED WILMA REALTY/ E 200,000 OFFICE $16,000,000
INTERNATIONAL VIB N.V.
1983 SWITZERLAND 10 S LaSALLE FIDINAM E 750,000 RETAIL/ $100,000,000
(D*1987) OFFICE (P)
? ENGLAND 20 N. LASALLE UK PENSION FUND: E ? OFFICE ?
ALLIED LINES
1981 NETHERLANDS O'HARE CORP. BAIRD WARNER DUTCH PENSION E 200,000 SUBURBAN $12, 500,000
TOWERS FUND: SSP (2 BLD6S) OFFICE
1987* JAPAN (PENDING) ?? OFFICE
1986 JAPAN XEROX CENTER SUMITOMO TRUST D 755,000 OFFICE $50,000,000
& BANKING
1987* JAPAN (PENDING) CHICAGO ? 900,000 MIXED-USE
(D) DEVELOPER (E)
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SOURCE
DATE COUNTRY PROPERTY
DOMESTIC
PARTNER/
SELLER
1980 NETHERLANDS THREE FIRST GERALD
NAT'L PLAZA HINES
INVESTOR
ROYAL DUTCH
SHELL
FORM SO. FT. PROP. TYPE PRICE
D ? OFFICE
1986 ENGLAND NORTHBROOK HOMART BROSEVENOR E-D 1,304,045 REGIONAL $116,000,000
COURT INTERNATIONAL NALL
1984 NETHERLANDS OAKBROOK BAIRD WARNER DUTCH PENSION D-E 200,000 SUBURBAN
TERRACE FUND: SSP JV OFFICE
1987* JAPAN ? CHICAGO JAPANESE E-JV 650, 000 OFFICE
DEVELOPER CONSTRUCT. CO.
1987 NETHERLANDS COLUMBIA FIFIELD DEVEL ? ? ? SUBURBAN ?
CENTER (D*) CO OFFICE
1982 SAUDI 500 N MICHIGAN RUBLOFF PRIVATE E 600,000 OFFICE $20,000,000
ARABIA INDIVIDUAL (EXCL. LAND)
1980 SAUDI OAKBROOK INTNAT'L ? E 300,000 SUBURBAN $30,000,000
ARABIA OFFICE CENTER (4 BLDGS) OFFICE
1986* JAPAN XXX LASALLE U.S. INS. CO. JAPANESE INS. CO.E-JV 785,000 OFFICE $210,000,000
1983 GERMANY LINCOLN MALL LENDHORF GROUP E ? REGIONAL
MALL
1986 GERMANY CHICAGO RIDGE ? ? E ? REGIONAL ?
MALL (1) MALL
1985 SAUDI 303 W. MADISON JAYMONT ?
ARABIA (D*1987)
1987* JAPAN (PENDING) ? OFFICE
(D*198X) - Development project/completion date
(E*) - Estimate
(P) - Total project cost, foreign equity investment unknown
E - Equity
D - Debt
* - Pending transaction
(1) - Property sold one month after purchase to domestic firm.
**This list is not all inclusive and no doubt some foreign owned
property has been overlooked. While every attempt was made to be
accurate, there say be some inaccuracies in the data.
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